Space and Time

My research paper will focus on the concepts of space and time, and their application in metaphysical thought. Specifically, I want to address the issues of whether space and time are real things that occur in nature, or if they are simply constructed by the mind. To answer this question, as well as establish more fundamental ideas about the functions of space and time, I will primarily consult the metaphysical writings of Immanuel Kant, Henri Bergson, and Martin Heidegger. Since we have not yet covered Heidegger’s Being and Time in class, this particular argument will not be discussed in my presentation. In my paper, I will draw from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as well as the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Bergson’s Creative Evolution, and certain academic articles about these philosophers’ views on space and time.

First, it is important to put space and time in the chronology of philosophical thought. To do this, I will discuss the differences between philosophers writing pre-skepticism and then post-skepticism, the era of Kant, Bergson, and Heidegger. Space and time were important aspects of ancient Greek philosophy, but Greeks never imagined a world separate from the mind and our knowledge. This idea originated in the “skeptic” period of philosophy, and it serves as the basic principle upon which these three post-skepticism philosophers are writing about space and time in metaphysics. In order to concretely examine the problem Kant and company are writing about, it is necessary to understand the original ideas held by the ancient Greeks. In the Physics, Aristotle establishes his basic assumptions of space (which he called “place”) and time in Book 4 (Delta). Aristotle’s concept of place is very different from the neutral, blank Cartesian space, especially because it is oriented toward and around, and effectively determined by, the objects in it. Place of anything, for Aristotle, is “the first unmoved boundary of what surrounds it” (Hope, 66). Place is unlike “space” in that instead of co-existing with an object, a place is rather a boundary or surface for the object. Only movable bodies can be in a place. Being in time is being measured, since an object’s being is measured in time. Time is a constant attribute of movements, so things that do not move or rest are not in time. Because it is relative to the motion of things, Aristotle does not define time as existing on its own. A brief inclusion of Aristotle’s notions of place and time serve to show the progression of thought on these concepts, since Aristotle was not even asking the same question as post-skepticism philosophers because the Greek philosophical world view did not account for separating the world from our mind.

Kant, Bergson, and Heidegger all agree that space and time are not natural or just independent things in the world, but rather that they are our mind’s way of positively conditioning the world so that we can have knowledge of it. However, each philosopher differs on certain aspects of these concepts, which have larger implications both in their works and metaphysics itself. The goal of the paper will be to examine the purposes and consequences of the commonalities and differences amongst these three philosophers.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, devotes the Transcendental Aesthetic to the essential elements knowledge is constructed of (but do not constitute knowledge itself), including the formal, a priori intuitions of space and time. Time and space, are formal because they impose positive conditions on the world, and Kant takes care to specify that although we impose these properties and they may therefore be fictive, they are still necessary conditions for our intuition of an object. They must be a priori because every intuition we have ever had is spatiotemporal, indicating that we simply cannot conceive of anything that does not exist in space or time, and time is in fact meaningless apart from its application to objects. The parts of Kant’s argument I want to examine are the relationship between space and time (as a priori forms of intuition) and reason, and between our minds and the natural world. Reason, according to Kant, wants to take concepts and the categories outside of the boundaries imposed by space and time. I also want to apply this seemingly contentious relationship to the connection between the world and our minds. Since we impose conditions and forms of intuition (space and time) upon the world, what does this mean for our worldview, as well our ability to participate in a “natural world” fundamentally defined by our own mental capabilities? Besides drawing mainly from the Transcendental Aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason to provide the evidence to ground these claims, I will use the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics to incorporate the few examples and clarifications Kant provided after writing the CPR.

In Creative Evolution, Bergson identifies time as something lived, that fundamentally defines our experiences in the world and within our own minds. He argues that our minds, as well as science, function on the cinematographic model, by which we use events as markers to break the continual monotony of duration. Bergson claims that “life and action are free” by virtue of “making ourselves conscious of our progress in pure duration, the more we feel the different parts of our being enter into each other” (201). He also asserts that our personalities and minds are at ease with and function within space, because the mind uses the form of space to divide matter as the needs of our actions necessitate. According to Bergson, space is neither “so foreign o our nature as we imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it” (202). The parts of Bergson’s argument I want to incorporate draw more heavily from his discussion of time, specifically the impact of his concept of time upon memory, consciousness, and the real duration of life. In providing his explanation of space, Bergson directly responds to Kant, and I plan to incorporate this argument in the paper to establish not only what Bergson wished to critique in Kant’s argument, but what effect that has on his own.

The Metaphysics of Ethics

My research paper will explore the metaphysical foundations of ethics. To do this, I will investigate the theories of two philosophers, examining their ideas in a metaphysical context and attempting to show how their ideas can work together. These two philosophers will be Immanuel Kant and Martin Buber. All of us have read at least some Kant for this class, but my paper will explore one of Kant’s other works (which many of you might have read also), the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Foundations was published in 1785, just four years after the Critique of Pure Reason. The subsequent Metaphysics of Morals, for which the Foundations was supposed to lay the groundwork, was not published until 1797 and is viewed as somewhat less significant than the Foundations and the Critique of Practical Reason which followed shortly after it.

In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that ethics must be set on a priori ideals. He begins his discussion of a “common sense” morality and determines the need for pure, a priori ideas upon which to basis his ethic. The goal of Kant’s system is that every rational being, because of their rationality, should be able to deduce the same moral laws from their own reason. If one can determine a pure basis for morality, then one can see such laws created on this purity as being necessary and universal. After all of his work examining how our minds work with a priori level in the first Critique, Kant uses the Foundations to show a practical application of these theories. He creates (or just discovers? depending on your outlook on a priori ideas) the categorical imperative that he believes every rational being should be able to follow in order to deduce the morality of an action. The categorical imperative, which is based on an idea of universal morality, says one should “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”

The parts of Kant’s theory that I want to examine most heavily are those concerning his definition of personhood and how the application of the categorical imperative leads to the development of the “kingdom of ends” and his treatment of the “other” apart from ourselves. Kant defines personhood by rationality. The being that has a rational capacity and can exercise said capacity to act according to the categorical imperative qualifies as a person. Persons are capable of determining laws for themselves because they act according to the universal and thus also act as law giving citizens of their community.

This idea ties into Kant’s kingdom of ends because a kingdom of ends is a community of persons. One spin-off of the categorical imperative relates to persons in particular; Kant says a person, because of the intrinsic worth (dignity) granted to them by the use of their rational capacity, is never to be treated merely as a means; persons are to be treated always as ends in themselves. In the kingdom of ends, every person is treated according to their dignity and rationality. Every member of the community provides laws for the community by use of their rational capacity and also acts in accordance with universal laws because of their duty. On a metaphysical level, I want to explore how these ideas relate to the question of being and the self as Kant defines them for the basis of his ethical system.

Martin Buber published I and Thou in 1923, over 130 years after Kant’s Foundations. I and Thou is not typically seen as a metaphysical text nor really an ethical one, but I believe a detailed look at the basics of Buber’s work could be taken from a metaphysical approach. Despite his Jewish background, Buber took on the secular study of philosophy. His work, I and Thou, however, shows some influence of his upbringing. The goal of his work was to show the two different forms of relation which he deems “I-It” and “I-Thou” (which is now translated as “I-You”).

In the first part of I and Thou, Buber states that humanity lives in a world of “Its.” Most things we enter into relation with are only objects to us. The use of verbs has encouraged this relationship: we say “I have something,” or “I know something.” The verb requires an object to help define the “I.” One important thing to note about Buber’s “I” is that he believes the I only comes into existence when put in relation to either the It or the You (Thou). Without the other, there is no object with which to compare or define the I and thus the I as we claim it does not exist.

To be in relation with the It means one is experiencing the It. One cannot “experience” the You, Buber says, for relation with the You takes a different form. To experience something, one must focus on it as an object, see it as its qualities and features. One only gives part of one’s being to this relationship, and the object, as a mere passive faculty, is not affected by the observer.

On the opposite end, a relationship with the You requires one’s whole being. This is an active relationship in which both the I and the You are affected by the relationship. The I-You relationship takes a seeing the being as a whole, exactly as it is, without regards to its qualities and features because once one focuses on these parts, the You becomes the It once more.

Buber notes that most I-You relationships are fleeting; they are impossible to sustain forever because of our human nature. It is part of our misfortune as humans that we must always revert to an I-It relationship. One kind of I-You relationship Buber says does last for eternity is that with the Eternal Thou (God). These beliefs are where I pick up on a Jewish influence, but they are outside of the metaphysical scope I intend to examine in Buber.

With Buber, I will also be looking at the question of being and the self because his philosophy shows different forms of being (as a relationship) and how the self can be dependent on the other. In combining Buber and Kant, I want to consider how Buber’s definitions could fit into Kant’s ethical theories. I believe considering the I-You relation will be helpful in understanding personhood and the kingdom of ends in Kant so as to gain a better grasp on the metaphysical basis of Kant’s ethic.