Time

As we have studied the metaphysics of many philosophers this semester, the theme of time has presented itself over and over. We have seen many differing conceptions of time, invariably shaped by and informing the metaphysics of those who espouse them. I have found thus far these theories of time unsatisfying. Some seem overly simple streams of moments, while others vague flowing abstractions that flee understanding. I hope in this paper to examine a number of theories of time, that I may better understand them and move toward my own theory of time.

Aristotle's metaphysics is a teleological one. His beings are driven by purpose and potential. He cites a being's natural state as at rest, but notes the abundance of change occurring. In Aristotle, we find that time can have no beginning or end, yet we have the Prime Mover. Aristotle's account of time invariably incorporates his teleological yet oddly mechanistic account of causation. I hope in my paper to better understand Aristotle's account of time, either through a review of his Metaphysics or exploration into his other works (notably his Physics).

Leibniz's mechanism suggests a largely chronological consideration of time, rather one composed of moments. However his determinism (like most determinisms) brings into question the very existence of time. If the future can be determined by the present, which could be fully gleaned from the past, is there any true differentiation between these "moments" of time? I hope to more clearly state the implications of both determinism and mechanism upon time, using Leibniz as a jumping board.

In Kant, we find time as a necessary condition of knowledge, therefore inherent in all thought. But this omnipresent time, is it "real" or "ideal"? (This debate I draw from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "Kant's Views on Space and Time") While I have yet to resolve this question myself, I hope to both get Kant's view on this and provide my own should it (as is likely) differ from his. From here, I may include exploration of A-series and B-series modes of time, and how the texts and I personally conceive time.

Bergson provides perhaps the most appealing conception of time amongst the texts we’ve read. He fights against the urge to examine time in its moments, calling such cinematographic separation arbitrary and false. He keenly notes that in the name of looking at time, we often stop it, hardly a foolproof method for gaining truth. I feel Bergson’s look at time places a premium on context, something I value in all forms of philosophic inquiry and strive to include in my own theory.

Conceptions of time are incredibly susceptible to human biases or fears. I think many conceptions of time are greatly influenced by human fears or hopes, such as those regarding mortality, shared experience, and natural order. I hope to elucidate where these influences upon theories of time are positive or damaging, logical or unjustly invested. Ultimately, time is a difficult subject to examine, as it is so intertwined to human action, experience, and thought. My ambitious aims to conclude my project include exploring Heidegger's inquiries into Being and Time, and articulating a personal understanding of time. On the way to forming such an understanding, I hope to learn from the philosophers we have studied while using some modern science as a foil for my thoughts. One text I enjoy and hope to use in considering some of the more bizarre scientific findings on time is Stephen Hawking's Brief History of Time. In summary, I plan to follow these routes of inquiry toward a coherent and focused consideration and thesis of time.

Ever Changing Markets

Earlier in my experience of Rhodes I intended to become an economics major. I later decided to abandon a major in economics in favor of one in philosophy. Though I am no longer majoring in economics I have not lost my interest in it. Ironically, in many ways philosophy has enhanced my understanding of economics in a way that I would not have found in a strictly economics focus.
Philosophy is the quintessential liberal arts subject because it is concerned with knowledge, the basis for all other subjects. The distinction and disciplines of the sciences, arts, and all of their subsections is a purely artificial distinction. I, just as philosophy, am concerned with the seams of learning, the places where one subject is connected to another, in this instance the intersection between economics and philosophy.
The intersection between philosophy and economics is quite extensive, and so in my research paper I wanted to focus specifically on how Bergson’s idea of flux and ever changing laws and facts relates to economies and markets. Bergson’s ideas fit naturally into economics, specifically a free market view because they preclude any effective central planning.
Markets are an example of spontaneous order, and just like nature they are in constant flux. A key to a successful business is finding a niche in a market, but they key to maintaining a successful business is constantly adapting to the ever changing market. A visualization of this concept could be some sort of fluid puzzle in which the pieces were continuously changing shape and so forcing you to constantly adapt yourself to fit within the fluid model.
My first source is Bergson’s creative evolution. In my paper, markets behave like Bergson describes nature, a constant flux. It is tempting, especially to economists, to claim that with enough information they can predict the future of a market. It might initially seem that once the rules of economics are understood that if enough factors can be known the market can be predicted. This is not so, the flaw in thinking resides in the idea that the laws and factors are static, and can so be used to accurately predict the future of market.
The inability to predict the future of a market is driven at the most basic level by understanding the market to any degree. By measuring the market we change it, much like our inability to know the speed and location of a particle because by measuring it we alter its location or speed. So to by measuring a market and acting on that information do we alter the market. A good example of this would be the stock market where knowing the price of something, or knowing some information about a company in the market will actually change the market.
So how are we to respond and operate in a market with an unpredictable future? The second source I am using is The Art of the Long View by Peter Schwartz. Schwartz proposes a system of probably planning in order to deal with an ever changing and unpredictable model.
Schwartz suggest creating a frame work of possible solutions and developing options that contain in themselves solutions to multiple possible futures. Using this method one can have a variety of options each which can be adopted to a variety of possible futures allowing one plan somewhat effectively for an unpredictable future.
In dealing with Bergson’s ideas in general and specifically how they apply to economics it is important not to improperly emphasize the rapidity of changing laws and factors. While some factors may change at extremely fast rates, not all of them will, and the majority of the laws the govern and are influenced by the factors will be even lest quick to change. Schwartz recognizes this and makes comment by saying that while much of the future is unclear, there are certain immediate factors which will very probably happen. The example that he gives is that if it rains in the Himalayas then it will flood in the Ganges river.
Following this analogy we find that while much of the future is unpredictable some things in markets can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy even if by acting on these probably events the markets themselves are changed.
My third source is Sigmund Freud Civilization and its Discontents . while Schwartz’s writings deal with the chaos of markets on a very practical level, Freud’s work as parallels the markets in the dynamic model he proposes of desire and the means by which we seek to satisfy them. There is a certain view of economics that claims that we have set needs, and on these constants we can begin to predict markets. The problem with this economics perspective is that it assumes that our desires are independent of the objects they pursue, making them static.
Freud however disagrees with this model of desires and objects. He proposes, in a similar line of reasoning to Bergson, that our desires are modified by the objects the pursue, as well as the reciprocal being true. In this model there is dynamic nature which defies prediction.
Freud and his work are important to consider because it focuses on the concept of flux at a very abstract and conceptual level. This abstract level is also the most basic level for practical applications. Dealing with these concepts at the abstract, or basic level, allows us the examine the concepts free of their practical actuation which can be distracting and limiting at times. Examining things at the conceptual level also affords a fresh perspective from which new patterns may be discovered and examined.
Markets are a spontaneous order that is in a constant flux. It is impossible to predict a market just by discovering all of the factors because the factors are constantly changing and modifying the laws that govern them. This model is reflected in Freud’s work Civilization and its Discontents with his argument about desires and their relation to objects . Peter Schwartz in his book The Art of the Long View discuses solutions and manners in which one can deal with an ever changing market.

Causation and an Environmental Ehtic

We have read a great deal on causal theories and how they relate to the nature of being over the course of the semester. In my research paper, I would like to explore these theories, what they reveal about our conception of nature, and through that conception, determine any ethical obligations we as humans might have to protect/respect the world in which we take part. Starting with causal theories, I intend to look at what we have read from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, as well as Bergson’s Creative Evolution. Additionally, I will be using Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac.

Beginning with teleology according to Aristotle, one of the ways in which a thing can change is through the actualizing of its potential. Simply, everything in nature, indeed nature itself, is drawn to a final cause. Individually, everything is naturally pulled to its own “telos” or end which is the greatest good that the thing has the potential to achieve. What I want to address here is whether or not all things, living and nonliving, are working/pulled towards their own ends (good), and whether or not it would be considered unethical to interrupt a being’s process of achieving that end. Under an ethic based on teleologic causation, would we be obligated to preserve the teleological efforts of all beings or would this be limited to other humans, sentient beings, non-sentient living beings, or extended to all things? In other words, should a thing be aware, either consciously or sentiently of its prevention from achieving its telos in order to be ethically protected?

Next, I intend to explore Bergson’s Creative Evolution, and more specifically his answer to the problem of causation, vitalism. Bergson first rejects both mechanism (which I am choosing to ignore in my paper on the grounds that, by positing that all things strictly adhere to the laws of nature, no room is left for morality) and radical teleology based upon his conception of nature as an undetermined, self-moving creative process which is capable of producing completely original entities. Vitalism explains causation as an expanding force without a set end to dictate its direction and natural laws are changing are not absolute, but changing along with the ceaselessly changing world they attempt to explain. Bergson gives the example of a river, constantly flowing, and upon meeting an obstacle, splitting, but not ceasing. And while there is no set purpose nor specific direction towards which evolution is drawn by some end, one might consider that its only desire (for lack of a better word) is to continue in its exponential progression.

What I would like to look at, concerning vitalism, is the question of what degree of manipulation humans have on the process of evolution. Are we merely obstacles of the river of evolution from which it can easily pass by, unscathed, or are we damming it up so that it is reduced to a stream, in danger of drying up? Additionally, Bergson tells us that science, by nature, “treats the living like the inert, applying the same forms [as inorganic matter].” If, through our industrial society and our perception of living things as objects for our benefit, we are narrowing the course of evolution by systematically removing species after species, are we obliged to change our ways in order to revive biodiversity? Should we be concerned with the species themselves or ecosystems as a whole? Should we be allowed to treat animals, plants and ecosystems as objects of our own convenience and pleasure?

This is where Leopold’s “The Land Ethic,” which is contained in A Sand County Almanac, would come into play. Leopold, an American naturalist of the 20th century, describes the world in a way that is not far from Bergson’s conception of life: everything, living and nonliving, is connected--man as a part of the biotic community. In “The Land Ethic,” Leopold sets out to create an ethic which puts limits on “freedom of action in the struggle for existence.” His land ethic, I think, should prove useful in answering the questions in the above paragraph, and might provide one solution t0 our stranglehold on evolutionary progress.

Kant Vs. Bergson Religion

Kant’s Summum Bonum VS. Bergson

In class we learned that Kant said that trying to rationally prove God would be fruitless attempt by our rationality. However while this is true, he later returns to the idea of God and an immortal soul in order to help back his ethical theory. Kant and Bergson disagree on many levels in their philosophy. When comparing and contrasting Kant’s idea of God and the Summum Bonum with the ideas of Bergson in Two Sources of Morality and Religion, we see many differences between the two philosophers, and many things that Bergson would criticize Kant for. Bergson creates an idea of a Static religion, which to him is inferior to his other idea of Dynamic religion. Kant’s beliefs in God has many similarities to Bergson’s ideas of Static religion, which shows a criticism of Kant’s way of thinking. Bergson offers a different idea of Dynamic religion as a superior alternative to Kant’s beliefs which allows for evolution, an idea essential to Bergson.

Kant believes that the ultimate Goal of rational beings is the Summum Bonum or Highest good. It is the goal of rational beings, and it is the way of life necessary for happiness. However it is not the concept of happiness that we normally think of. Instead what Kant is saying is that following the categorical imperative and achieving the Summum Bonum allows us to be worthy of happiness. It is still possible to be a completely moral agent, and not be happy. He merely is saying that those who are moral should be the only ones worthy of being happy. The Summum Bonum does not teach people how to be happy, it merely teaches them how to be good and worthy of a pleasurable life.

Kant believes in a Deontological philosophy based on reason, however he admits in his book that in order for people to achieve the Summum Bonum or highest good as it is translated there must be a God and an immortal soul. A short summary of Kant’s argument would be that as rational beings, we are morally obligated to achieve the highest moral good. (This argument is made because to Kant morality is derived from rationality). He then argues that for there to be a highest Good there must be an omnipotent and all knowing God that gives moral order to the Universe. He says that “this Divine Being must be omnipotent, in order that the whole nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to his will; omniscient, that He may know our innermost sentiments and their moral worth [this is because moral worth is tied in with our intent and natural tendencies as they stand with duty]; omnipresent, that he may be immediately at hand for satisfying of every need which the highest good demands; eternal, that this nature and freedom ma never fail, etc.” (Kant 642). Therefore in order to strive for the Summum Bonum we must postulate a God as the source of it. He says that throughout time “it was moral ideas that gave rise to the concept of Divine Being that we now hold to be correct” (Kant 643). Without a divine being to bring order to things his system of ethics falls begins to fall apart. His concept of God exists to bring moral order to society. Without God there would therefore be no morality.

This is an idea similar to Bergson concept of Static religion. Bergson defines two types of religion that are both important in society. The first of which is Static religion, and it has some similarities to Kant’s argument. “Static religion … attaches man to life, and consequently the individual to society by telling him tales on a par with those with which we lull children to sleep” (Bergson 200). Bergson says that in a system of closed morality, or unadapting morality, there needs to be a system that prevents people from questioning the system and defying the laws that hold that society together. He says that in static religions myths are created that create Gods and immortal souls that promise reward or punishment in regular life, or the afterlife. These religions say that a higher presence watches them and upholds the doctrine of morality. In a static religions Gods are used as to create standards as ways of life that man should follow. These gods thwart our “intelligence” when it tends to stray and think of ideas that could possibly upset the social order. Bergson believes that facts influences our beliefs, our philosophy, and even our conception of natural laws. Meaning that if an intelligent person gathers certain facts it can change the whole society, because “nothing can resist facts” (Bergson 99). Bergson says that “myths” or hallucinations of facts are created in this type of religion to preserve society; “if intelligence was to be kept at the outset from sliding down a slope which was dangerous to the individual and society, it could be only by the statement of apparent fact, by the ghosts of facts; failing real experience, a counterfeit of experience had to be conjured up” to prevent this (Bergson 99). To prevent people from straying away and using true facts to change society, the myths and Gods in this society create opposing facts to prevent people from straying and using those ideas. It is easy how another parallel to Kant can be made here. In a static religion new ideas that question the standards already set up in that society like morality and other ideas are demonized. According to Bergson Static religion is a completely closed system. This is similar to Kant, not only is God or the divine in charge of handling morality and upholding it in both theories, both Kant and Static religions are in closed systems. Kant’s system of morality does not allow for any moral deviation from the categorical imperative, anything that does so is immoral. Also, since Kant separates science from philosophy and denies scientific knowledge that might change his philosophy, it makes it seem like Kant’s idea of God could be a Static religion. No matter how the times change, to Kant what is moral and immoral remains the same. It is the same thing in a static religion. Anybody that comes up with ideas that differ from the preset norms, or do not follow the norms are demonized. Bergson says that these are created because of The Gods in both these uphold the current norms against all others. As you can see though there are many parallels to between Kant and static religion.

Bergson later in the book describes is superior alternative known as dynamic religion, which, unlike static religion which is based on supposed rules or laws of nature that repress new thought and facts, is actually based on evolution, intelligence, and creativity as he mentions in Creative Evolution. In this he mentions that in Dynamic religion, religion must be based on actual experiences felt by people in that society. He uses an example of Christian saints, or prophets when describing this. To Bergson Dynamic religion is based off of actual experiences. Because it is a religion based on actual experiences it allows for change. Dynamic religion does not make up false experiences to prevent actual contrary experiences, like static religion. It simply relies on the actual. These people who experienced the true mystical experiences are also capable to spread it around and inspire others to find actual relations with God. Bergson mentions the saints as an example of this. Their actual experiences with God allowed them to help inspire others to the Christian Faith. Bergson finds this form of religion superior because it is based on actual experience; it is not based on preventing other from doing things or expanding their intelligence to other areas. It allows for evolution of ideas and society. One can say that there is an example of this in the bible. At first followers of Jesus were chastised for breaking from the current norm, but through an actual encounter with God they were able to make Christianity spread. They were able to evolve beyond what people who hold to only traditional ideas of religion at the time believed. Allowing for new intelligence allowed for new ideas to form and for religion to evolve.

It is clear that Kant and Bergson have many differences in their beliefs. What Kant believes is necessary in the Summum Bonum contradicts greatly with many ideals held by Bergson. These differences seem be the same as their disagreements in Creative Evolution, stemming from Kant’s desire for fixed ideas and Bergson’s plea for the need of evolution.

Time (sans parsley, sage, and rosemary)

Time is a tricky thing, though not a “thing” in a metaphysical sense. Some would try to mystify it as such, to turn it solid—or, perhaps more fittingly, liquid. Some would even take it a step further and try to control it with the aid of science-fiction and the theoretical ramifications of relativity. Fortunately, faster-than-light travel is still impossible, and humanity is yet safe from temporal anomalies. However, it is equally strange when some make the claim that time doesn’t exist at all. What do they mean by this? It is probably true that time is not a thing itself, but to attempt to use the same vocabulary we ascribe to actual things—“existence” or the lack thereof—is simply inappropriate considering the word “time” itself. After all, “time” is merely a succinct word for the natural phenomenon of the earth rotating around the sun. Still, philosophers and crackpots alike have a peculiar fondness with trying to explain the nature of time. Metaphysicians, too, have frequently explored the subject in their individual explanations on the nature of “being” itself. This has produced several different interpretations, approaches, and interesting thought exercises; which explanation is best or, at least, the most useful? Both Emanuel Kant and Henri Bergson would seem to have very different accounts on the nature of time, but the major difference is in their respective approaches. Kant provides a very fitting explanation of how time appears to work for humans in his discourse on the nature of human reason. Bergson, on the other hand, more adequately describes the actual nature of the world as constantly in motion, or in “flux,” to use his terminology. However, both philosophers, as well as those who came before and after them, provide useful accounts of what this whole “time” business is all about.

The basic premise of my research topic would be to examine the different ways metaphysicians have approached the subject of “time” throughout the evolution of the discipline. Besides simply enumerating the different interpretations, I want to focus on how, exactly, each philosopher uses the subject in their overall arguments and how convincing their approach to time is. This would involve raising possible objects as well as acknowledging each argument’s strengths. A logical starting point would be the works of Aristotle, but I don’t really recall there being any in-depth discussion of “time” therein. This might not be a problem, however, if I start by examining how the common man thought about time over the course of history. I wouldn’t go too in-depth; I would simply take into consideration how people kept track of time and how their ability to do so improved. Initially, one would assume, man merely paid attention to the sun’s relative position in the sky, acknowledging that there were regular intervals of light and dark. Eventually, sundials were developed, followed by more and more sophisticated means of dividing the interval between each of the earth’s rotations. It took awhile for them to realize that this was, in fact, what brought about the phenomenon of “days,” but that’s beside the point.

So far, the most useful example of how the passage of time appears to humans is found in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason.” Because we can remember what we were doing the last time the earth rotated around its axis, the concept of “the past” is readily understandable. Likewise, we tend to be preoccupied with what is yet to come after the next rotation, so we have the concept of “the future.” Of course, we can only ever inhabit the present, a fact I’ll explore later in the paper. The focus of this section is simply of Kant’s conception of time as the “inner sense” of the human mind: singular yet divisible—there are no “times”—infinite, and one-dimensioned. As it appears to us, we can only move forward through time, unless any of the aforementioned science-fiction theories turn out to be possible. If interpreted incorrectly, one could raise a few objections. Is time actually infinite or divisible? However, Kant’s point is that it cannot appear to work in any other way due to the structure of human reason, which, common sense dictates, is certainly true. While there are possible objections raised by Kant’s explanation of said structure, his overall argument is not within the scope of this paper.

When it comes to the question of how time actually works, I believe Bergson offers the best explanation. With his interest in genetics and evolution, he sees the world and all beings in a constant process of change—what he calls “flux.” His overall criticism of science’s tendency to describe every minute detail of a given object or process, failing to really expand our understanding of said object in and of itself, applies to time as well. Whereas science tries to freeze a given moment of time—or a particular facet of an object—in order to study it and understand it, it ignores the fact that time itself never freezes. It is the continual process of the earth revolving around the sun and itself. However, he does not think that we should do away with watches, clocks, or even sundials. Our intellect cannot help but study things in a scientific way, and it is actually useful to do so. This is obvious to anyone who tries to organize an event, such as a philosophy class. Our division of a single rotation of the earth around its axis into hours, minutes, and seconds allows us to more easily comprehend a given stage in the earth’s rotation as a given time; then, we’ll know when during said rotation we need to show up in a given class room. This is in keeping with Bergson’s belief that scientific thought is a good thing as long as we realize that it does not adequately explain the true nature of the world.

Judging by the title of Heidegger’s work which we are yet to read, it seems like he will be another useful lens through which to examine the subject of “time.” However, as I have not started reading him yet, I have no idea exactly what he will contribute to my overall project. I have also come across a few other philosophical considerations and arguments about time that may be of use for this project. One of the main debates of the nature of time is the spilt between those who believe that there was a past, is a present, and will be a future and those who believe that time has no tense, that it simply appears to because of how our brains view causes and effects. However, there are many pseudo-mystical explanations involved with some of these arguments that may simply bog down my topic in thought experiments. While these arguments are certainly entertaining, they attempt to approach time from outside the human experience, which really isn’t all that useful. They seem to try to turn time into a thing in and of itself when it is basically a word created by people to encompass the ceaseless motion of the earth and—more broadly—the universe. If we could examine the entirety of existence in a semi-godlike fashion (i.e. see everything, but through a human perspective), an individual action on earth would most likely coincide with whatever else is happening in the ever-present now. If, on the other hand, the past and future exist alongside the present (as some believe) and God is able to see it all, such a sight would surely blow our fucking minds. However, this thought process raises a whole slew of arguments about the possibility/nature of such a being and the actual nature of existence. Such considerations are simply outside the scope of my topic, any answers outside of the scope of human reason.

Theism and Atheism

In studying philosophy, no question is more compelling to me than the question of whether a God is necessary for the Universe and life to exist. The reason I took this course was to explore this very question. Essentially the argument for theism vs. atheism comes down to an argument a materialist, naturalist, and mechanist view of the way the universe works against a determinist and purposeful view of the world. To be clear, I will not be arguing for a theistic or atheistc view of the universe, because through my research and personal experience, this view I have an impartial argument would be ideal to find the truth of the matter. Although as a warning it is nearly impossible to take an issue this personal to both myself and many others in such an impartial manner.

I will first go through C.S. Lewis’s famed argument from reason in defense of Christianity as analyzed by Victor Reppert in the Book C.S. Lewis: Life, Works and Legacy. I this argument, a materialist or naturalist account of the universe describes a world where everything that has happened or will happen is causally connected in a closed causal system. Each cause produces an effect which then goes on to produce another effect and so on for eternity. The Argument from reason cites that this account of the universe has several holes which cannot be accounted for. Lewis thought that if Naturalism was true then all beliefs could be explained through nonrational causes, and if no thought is valid if it is explained nonrationally, then if naturalism were true all thoughts are invalid. Naturalism, he presumes, does not leave room for cognition and rational thought. Because human beings reason and are conscious naturalism is invalid. The most important Argument from Lewis, however, is the inclusion of miracles. While Lewis argues that Biblical miracles could not be possible in a causally closed universe. I wish to extend his argument to say that life itself is a miracle. That we live in a universe that is organized and able to support life when it is much more likely in the naturalistic view that life cannot and should not exist. In the face of all that improbability a miracle has happened on this planet and in our universe, therefore, the universe is not causally closed. Moreover, Lewis makes the argument that consciousness does not lend itself to an evolutionary advantage. Nature, he says, would only allow us the opportunity to associate that a specific event follows the preceding event. Inferential, logical reasoning, or being able to deduce that events in general are causal, to say an even follows another, would be unlikely to arise evolutionarily and therefore must have been endowed by a creator. The final argument comes not from Lewis but from Aristotle’s Metaphysics and from Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics. A Naturalistic or causally connected view of the universe ultimately needs an ultimate cause or prime mover. Because something cannot exist from nothing, God must exist because the Universe exists.

However, a physicist and atheist named Lawrence Krauss in his lecture entitled, A Universe From Nothing, seems to counter the validity of a prime mover argument. While Krauss’s lecture is a physics lecture, and not a philosophy lecture, it does have profound religious and philosophical implications, and the tone of the lecture itself seems to be attacking religious beliefs. In his lecture, Krauss proves 2 fundamental properties of the universe that, in his view, prove that god does not need to exist for the universe to exist. He first proves that most of the energy in the universe, including the energy contained in ordinary matter like stars, planets, and humans, is held in empty space. So, in essence empty space isn’t empty at all, in fact its less empty than the rest of the universe, it is just undetectable. The second property is that the spatial curvature of the universe is flat, as opposed to a closed universe that curves back in on itself like a sphere, and an open universe, which is curved but open ended like a 4 dimensional piece of paper that has been folded almost in half but not quite. The combination of these two inferences about the universe produces some surprising conclusions. Krauss concludes that energy is empty space is constantly coming in and out of existence at a quantum level. Like matter/anti-matter inhalations, energy is constantly separating from and combining with negative energy. This means that the total energy of universe is zero. While that sounds like there is no energy in the universe, that assumption is incorrect. While the total energy of the universe is zero, energy and matter exist because there is an equal amount of negative energy and matter somewhere else in the universe. And because the total energy in the universe is zero, and energy a matter spontaneously come into existence from nothing on the quantum level, so long as an equal amount of negative energy and matter is also produced, this means that when the universe was sufficiently small is was entirely possible to come into existence from nothing. A universe that exists from nothing therefore does not require a deity to exist. This account also addresses the miracle argument that Lewis makes. Krauss postulates that the reason we exist in this universe is because we are here to observe it. Out of all the infinite possibilities of universes to exist in, we exist in this one because in all the other universes we cannot observe them therefore they are unknown to us. While the theist argument might conclude that because the conditions for life are so rare only with the assistance of a directing force outside our universe can life exist. Krauss proposes instead that because entire universes can be created spontaneously those universes could have existed and may exist in the future but only the ones where life is possible can conscious beings observe them.

cole's research presentation

For my research paper in metaphysics I decided to center it on a problem that all metaphysicians have been having since Aristotle: the problem of causation. From the time of Aristotle there have been issues concerning causation, whether it is something that is mechanical or teleological. In my paper I want to raise the issue of whether or not we can apply teleological causation, which we already are quick to apply to beings with consciousness, and apply it to things in nature that appear to us to have no consciousness at all. Three of the sources that I will be using in this paper are one: my primary source, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, specifically book two concerning causation. And for two of my secondary sources I will be using a book by Rowland Stout, “Things that happen because they should” and a book by Andrew woodfield titled, simply “Teleology”

From the very get go of Aristotle’s “Physics” he notes, “Some things are due to nature; for others there are other causes. Of the former sort are animals and their parts, plants, and simple bodies like earth, fire, air, and water.” Here right from the start is where the fork in the road splits the two modes of causation. Aristotle notices that in the world there are things that seem to be attributed to nature and there are these mysterious “other causes” these other causes will be the focus of my paper and specifically if these “other causes” can actually be applied to nature as a way to observe it.

Later in the text Aristotle will define these, “other causes” and he does so in chapter paragraph 30 when he says, “Further, it belongs to the same study, [the study of nature] to know the end or what something is for, and to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for [Telos in Greek]. For whenever there is a definite end to a continuous change, that last thing is also what it is for…” Here in lies one of the earliest difficulties of applying a teleological view of causation onto nature. That the Telos of a thing implies some type of purpose or end or it is something that Aristotle will say is not only the end, but is also the “best” of what it can be. If nature as Aristotle states were indeed a continuous change, then there would be no hope in labeling it with a telos, as it would never be able to reach its end. That is, if it is mealy an end, and not something else. If however, the end of a thing is not to be its ultimate and final end, but to be the best that it can be then the telos in nature seems quite logical. For example the final and ultimate end of a tree is not to grow and reproduce, because that reproduction dose not end the trees life it continues it by having another cause. But, if the telos of a thing and its purpose are to be the best that it can be, then the telos of the tree is certainly to be a seed bearing healthy multiplying tree. As this is the best thing that it can do and there is nothing better that it might hope to one day accomplish, such as learning to dance, or play the violin.

In stouts account of Teleology, He very quickly seperates teleological accounts into two distinct categories, “Justifications” and “causes” Stout’s argument is that what is given when a cause is explained teleological is not so much the cause of the thing, but instead a justification of the purpose of its happening. For example, “The teleological question why do we have teeth? Is asking for justification of teeth as well as a cause of them.” Therefore, it seems to be that when we ask questions of causation, what we are really asking is two things. The first justification, such as why do we have teeth at all? Why would we not be better off without them? What purpose do they serve us? As well as asking the latter question what is the cause of our having them? How did a chain of events occur such that we have come to have teeth? I know this seems like a silly example, but it is exactly these kinds of questions that rely on being able to make teleological claims. When attempting to make judgments about nature concerning theological causes, we must keep in mind these two aspects, both justification, and causation. Because once we move onto later thinkers who are concerned with the area of teleological causation the former cause of justification will become much more important and will be what we are really asking if we can make claims about in regards to nature.

My second secondary source lays out something else extremely important to the groundwork of any teleological expedition. Woodfield does an excellent job of noting what in nature sparks our interest in this question of purpose in causation and that is in the area of potentiality. He notes that it is through seeing what things in nature will inevitably become we come to conclude that nature has some type of direction or guidance. It is true that Aristotle has stated this before. But, Woodfield lays out the concept much more clearly.

“A flower, if it has the form of a rose, is a rose for that reason. Thus the form of a thing is intimately bound up with the idea of actuality and of being fully developed. Although a rosebud is not actually a rose, but only potentially, in calling it a bud of a rose we identify it in terms of what it is naturally going to become. To that extent the rosebud has potentially the form of a rose. “

While I apologize for the long block quote, it is of the utmost importance that this idea of potentiality gets fleshed out fully. For it is in this very idea of nature having potentiality that we come to think of nature as teleological at all and it is with this concept where my paper will begin.