For my research presentation I plan to explore the plausibility of causal relations and especially their connection to biological evolution. I hope to examine the extent to which our understanding of cause and effect accurately reflect the nature of the universe. I intend to analyze the relationship between a cause and an effect to determine what, if anything, connects the two. In this way, I hope to gain a better insight into both the process of the universe and my own mode of thinking.
Bergson criticizes both teleology and mechanism because they inevitably conclude, “All is given.” If every cause can be traced to its effects or every effect traced to its causes then the entirety of the universe could be predetermined given sufficient information and the appropriate equations. If this were the case then time would be irrelevant because every effect would have essentially already happened. Bergson argues towards certain creative power in the world. He states, “this reality is undoubtedly creative, i.e. productive of effects in which it expands and transcends its own being” (52). The cause, while observable in the first place, refuses to reveal its consequences prematurely. The precise effect cannot be known until it has unfolded in time. Bergson continues, “These effects were therefore not given in it in advance, and so it could not take them for ends, although, when once produced, they admit of a rational interpretation” (ibid). Teleology breaks down, according to Bergson, because causes do not anticipate their effects. It is only after the effect has been observed that the causal relation may be analyzed.
Hume calls into question causal relation all together. In his opinion, “knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience” (27). Causal relations are not known except by observation. Hume states that the explosive property of gunpowder, for instance, could never “be discovered a priori” (28). The distinction between observation and reasoning is crucial. One must first experience a cause and effect before one can reason the connection. Reason comes secondary to observation. Hume writes, “A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?” (29). This demonstrates that the world is not based on reason, but rather reason is based on the world. Future effects cannot be predicted a priori but must be rooted in previous knowledge. Likewise, a novel effect presents itself unexpectedly, and it is only after the event that causal connections may be drawn.
This is perhaps most evident in the study of evolution. Bergson writes, “That the appearance of a vegetable or animal species is due to specific causes, nobody will gainsay. But this can only mean that if, after the fact, we could know these causes in detail, we could explain by them the form that has been produced; foreseeing the form is out of the question” (27). According to Bergson, evolution offers a creativity to which causes can be inferred but of which effects cannot be predicted. For this reason, evolution does not follow a mechanistic or finalistic system. Bergson offers a metaphor: “no one, not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced—an absurd hypothesis which is its own refutation” (6-7).
Though intelligence produced the theory of evolution, intelligence is itself an evolutionary adaption. Like any other adaptation, such as the ability to fly, man’s exceptional intelligence has allowed him to exploit a niche in nature. If intelligence is considered in the context of evolution then it is no more than an adaptation to improve our survival. The perception of cause and effect stems from the intellect. It is here that we must determine to what degree this evolutionary adaptation accurately captures the nature of the world. We have already said that a pure reasoning of the world ungrounded in observation would not align itself with the world as it is observed. Hume writes, “When we reason a priori, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them” (31). The relationship between cause and effect is essentially unknown to reason; reason can only observe the sequence and then attribute a connection.
The assumption that our perception of causes and effects accurately reflect the nature of the world has lead to the development of mechanical and teleological systems. However, we are the ones imposing causality on nature. When one observes an event in nature contrary to one’s understanding, one manipulates the evidence until it confines to reason. Hume states, “It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation” (30). We may find success in attributing causes to effects on a relative level, but this in no way implies the universality of a cause-effect based system. Hume continues, “But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them” (ibid). I propose that causal relations are not an absolute necessity, but only a useful understanding developed by the intellect through observation.