While Aristotle would posit that humans and human sensibility are necessarily in harmony with the natural world, as it exists in actuality, Kant would argue to the contrary claiming we can have no “true” knowledge of objects in and of themselves. Kant asserts that the apriori formal conditions of our knowledge, namely space and time, allow us to intuit only those objects that conform to these apriori conditions. However, despite the fact that we can only intuit “representations” we nonetheless know that something must be responsible for the representation, namely the object in and of itself, so that our existence can still be considered as grounded in an objective reality. Accordingly, we too are subject to the apriori universal laws of nature that govern the sensible world. While our sensible intuitions and representations of the understanding must remain grounded in actual experience, as humans, and therefore rational beings, we are also endowed with the faculty of reason. In the final sections of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he shows the tendency of reason to always seek the unconditioned. However, because we can never sensibly intuit the unconditioned, reason by its very nature continually attempts to overstep its limitations. This is highlighted in the third antimony that shows how reason, when overstepping its limits, can lead to two contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, human freedom is necessary in regards to moral responsibility, but thereby creates a “lawlessness” and disunity of experience as it breaks the tie between cause and effect by allowing for spontaneity. On the other hand, if the universal laws of nature are all that govern the universe, there becomes an issue of infinite regress towards the unconditioned, something that reason by its very nature tends towards but can have no validated experience of.
While Kant leaves us at this seemingly irreconcilable divide between human freedom and the mechanistic laws of nature in his Critique of Pure Reason, he picks this concept back up in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and subsequently argues that the concept of morality can be found apriori in the faculty of reason.
Within his argument the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals he divides beings into two groups, non-rational and rational. He then defines human beings as a subset of rational beings that are a part of the intelligible world, but also necessarily tied to the sensible world. It is this dualistic nature that allows us to act freely and autonomously with regards to the intelligible world yet still be bound to the determinate laws of nature which govern our sensible world. Furthermore, because we are creatures of the sensible world we have desires, inclinations and sensations that oftentimes influence our actions, of which we freely choose. However, actions made solely for satisfying some desire or inclination of our own are not moral. Morality is defined as a duty of rational beings to act “as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (Groundwork, p. 31) and “act that you use your humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Groundwaork, p. 38). So that one must first consider if one’s actions could be viewed as universally applicable and second, assure oneself that humanity is not being used as a means of achieving one’s goal. This is because to use another person would be to encroach upon their autonomy and would therefore undermine the value of your own autonomy and human freedom in general.
Kant’s discussion of the tension between efficient causes of the natural world on sensible beings and the necessity of human freedom for autonomous rational beings raises many questions:
How is “nature” defined and what is our relation to it? Is there a distinction between the natural world and human nature (humanity)? If so, what is human nature? How does the presupposition of our relation to nature necessarily affect any metaphysical argument? How is the sensible world different from the intelligible world? What is the status given to the idea of autonomy and independence within the field of metaphysics generally? If we are a part of the natural world, are we ascribed a particular status in relation to other objects?
In regards to Kant’s delineation of “non-rational” and “rational” beings, an article by Allen Wood focuses on the ethical concerns of the treatment of non-rational beings. In other words, according to Kant’s argument, are we required to treat animals and nature as a whole with respect or, as seems the case, can we use them indiscriminately as means for achieving our own ends? Wood argues that the central problem is “Kant regards only rational beings as persons, which are not to be treated as ends, regarding all other beings as things” (Wood, 193). However, Wood believes Kant’s principles which require a duty of humans to respect humanity “as the ultimate end of nature” implicitly require that “we undertake the responsibility of shaping our ends in such a way that hey provide this system [ecosystem] with its […] harmony”(Wood, p. 204). In short, Wood is skeptical of the implications Kant’s Formula of Humanity could have, namely rational beings could merely use nature as they please, but ultimately believes Kant’s arguments, when taken as a whole, support efforts to preserve the natural world.
While the previous article analyzes the relationship between non-rational and rational beings, Michael Nelson’s article focuses on the interpersonal relationships of rational beings as a group. In attempts to better understand the actual ways in which Kant’s Formula of Humanity could be implemented socially, Nelson looks to Kant’s Formula of Autonomy and Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. Nelson proposes that because “rational agents can coordinate plans both intrapersonally and interpersonally” that Kant is really keying in on an “idea of social cooperation […] flexible enough to allow a variety of different, specific realizations” (Nelson, p. 105). In short, Nelson argues that it is not simply enough to value humans because they can, as autonomous beings, generate their own ends, but more importantly these ends under social and political contracts can be harmonized and mutually beneficial. Kant’s morality as interpreted by Nelson, “requires an ongoing process of give-and-take, mutual adjustment”( Nelson, p. 101). I would argue, however, against Nelson’s argument as I believe Kant would not refer to the laws of morality as a “process of give-and-take” to be adjusted relative to the individuals in question. Morality as viewed by Kant is a set of ahistorical, apriori rules necessitated by our faculty of reason (or more importantly the reason of any rational being). For humans, who must operate in both the sensible and intelligible world, the Kingdom of Ends is a mere ideal as the human race can never be expected to follow the categorical imperatives of morality as a necessary set of rules. We as a autonomous beings have choices and are influenced not only by moral duty, but also by sensible desires and the two cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at all times.
The other secondary sources to be used address the Kantian relationship between reason, morality, freedom. These articles “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”, “Kant’s Anti-determinism” and “The Value of Reason and the Value of Freedom”, all offer analysis of the seemingly paradoxical idea that it is within our autonomous freedom that we discover the apriori laws of morality. In brief, Kant’s argument follows that if we have reason, we must suppose ourselves to be self-causing and therefore “free” and autonomous. However, if we believe ourselves to be autonomous it none-the-less follows that we must accept the autonomy of all other rational beings. Therefore, we are morally obligated to respect humanity as an end (self-determining) and never as a means so that dignity is only achieved when we act in ways that would be deemed universally applicable.
While the main thesis is not yet refined, the central focus of the paper will be to elaborate on the concept of “nature” in reference to both the efficient laws of nature of which we are bound by the sensible world as well as the laws of morality of which we are bound by the intelligible world. Furthermore to fully understand Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it is important to elaborate on his division of non-rational and rational beings as well as his differentiation of a purely rational being and a human being.
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