Time

As we have studied the metaphysics of many philosophers this semester, the theme of time has presented itself over and over. We have seen many differing conceptions of time, invariably shaped by and informing the metaphysics of those who espouse them. I have found thus far these theories of time unsatisfying. Some seem overly simple streams of moments, while others vague flowing abstractions that flee understanding. I hope in this paper to examine a number of theories of time, that I may better understand them and move toward my own theory of time.

Aristotle's metaphysics is a teleological one. His beings are driven by purpose and potential. He cites a being's natural state as at rest, but notes the abundance of change occurring. In Aristotle, we find that time can have no beginning or end, yet we have the Prime Mover. Aristotle's account of time invariably incorporates his teleological yet oddly mechanistic account of causation. I hope in my paper to better understand Aristotle's account of time, either through a review of his Metaphysics or exploration into his other works (notably his Physics).

Leibniz's mechanism suggests a largely chronological consideration of time, rather one composed of moments. However his determinism (like most determinisms) brings into question the very existence of time. If the future can be determined by the present, which could be fully gleaned from the past, is there any true differentiation between these "moments" of time? I hope to more clearly state the implications of both determinism and mechanism upon time, using Leibniz as a jumping board.

In Kant, we find time as a necessary condition of knowledge, therefore inherent in all thought. But this omnipresent time, is it "real" or "ideal"? (This debate I draw from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "Kant's Views on Space and Time") While I have yet to resolve this question myself, I hope to both get Kant's view on this and provide my own should it (as is likely) differ from his. From here, I may include exploration of A-series and B-series modes of time, and how the texts and I personally conceive time.

Bergson provides perhaps the most appealing conception of time amongst the texts we’ve read. He fights against the urge to examine time in its moments, calling such cinematographic separation arbitrary and false. He keenly notes that in the name of looking at time, we often stop it, hardly a foolproof method for gaining truth. I feel Bergson’s look at time places a premium on context, something I value in all forms of philosophic inquiry and strive to include in my own theory.

Conceptions of time are incredibly susceptible to human biases or fears. I think many conceptions of time are greatly influenced by human fears or hopes, such as those regarding mortality, shared experience, and natural order. I hope to elucidate where these influences upon theories of time are positive or damaging, logical or unjustly invested. Ultimately, time is a difficult subject to examine, as it is so intertwined to human action, experience, and thought. My ambitious aims to conclude my project include exploring Heidegger's inquiries into Being and Time, and articulating a personal understanding of time. On the way to forming such an understanding, I hope to learn from the philosophers we have studied while using some modern science as a foil for my thoughts. One text I enjoy and hope to use in considering some of the more bizarre scientific findings on time is Stephen Hawking's Brief History of Time. In summary, I plan to follow these routes of inquiry toward a coherent and focused consideration and thesis of time.