For my research paper in metaphysics I decided to center it on a problem that all metaphysicians have been having since Aristotle: the problem of causation. From the time of Aristotle there have been issues concerning causation, whether it is something that is mechanical or teleological. In my paper I want to raise the issue of whether or not we can apply teleological causation, which we already are quick to apply to beings with consciousness, and apply it to things in nature that appear to us to have no consciousness at all. Three of the sources that I will be using in this paper are one: my primary source, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, specifically book two concerning causation. And for two of my secondary sources I will be using a book by Rowland Stout, “Things that happen because they should” and a book by Andrew woodfield titled, simply “Teleology”
From the very get go of Aristotle’s “Physics” he notes, “Some things are due to nature; for others there are other causes. Of the former sort are animals and their parts, plants, and simple bodies like earth, fire, air, and water.” Here right from the start is where the fork in the road splits the two modes of causation. Aristotle notices that in the world there are things that seem to be attributed to nature and there are these mysterious “other causes” these other causes will be the focus of my paper and specifically if these “other causes” can actually be applied to nature as a way to observe it.
Later in the text Aristotle will define these, “other causes” and he does so in chapter paragraph 30 when he says, “Further, it belongs to the same study, [the study of nature] to know the end or what something is for, and to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for [Telos in Greek]. For whenever there is a definite end to a continuous change, that last thing is also what it is for…” Here in lies one of the earliest difficulties of applying a teleological view of causation onto nature. That the Telos of a thing implies some type of purpose or end or it is something that Aristotle will say is not only the end, but is also the “best” of what it can be. If nature as Aristotle states were indeed a continuous change, then there would be no hope in labeling it with a telos, as it would never be able to reach its end. That is, if it is mealy an end, and not something else. If however, the end of a thing is not to be its ultimate and final end, but to be the best that it can be then the telos in nature seems quite logical. For example the final and ultimate end of a tree is not to grow and reproduce, because that reproduction dose not end the trees life it continues it by having another cause. But, if the telos of a thing and its purpose are to be the best that it can be, then the telos of the tree is certainly to be a seed bearing healthy multiplying tree. As this is the best thing that it can do and there is nothing better that it might hope to one day accomplish, such as learning to dance, or play the violin.
In stouts account of Teleology, He very quickly seperates teleological accounts into two distinct categories, “Justifications” and “causes” Stout’s argument is that what is given when a cause is explained teleological is not so much the cause of the thing, but instead a justification of the purpose of its happening. For example, “The teleological question why do we have teeth? Is asking for justification of teeth as well as a cause of them.” Therefore, it seems to be that when we ask questions of causation, what we are really asking is two things. The first justification, such as why do we have teeth at all? Why would we not be better off without them? What purpose do they serve us? As well as asking the latter question what is the cause of our having them? How did a chain of events occur such that we have come to have teeth? I know this seems like a silly example, but it is exactly these kinds of questions that rely on being able to make teleological claims. When attempting to make judgments about nature concerning theological causes, we must keep in mind these two aspects, both justification, and causation. Because once we move onto later thinkers who are concerned with the area of teleological causation the former cause of justification will become much more important and will be what we are really asking if we can make claims about in regards to nature.
My second secondary source lays out something else extremely important to the groundwork of any teleological expedition. Woodfield does an excellent job of noting what in nature sparks our interest in this question of purpose in causation and that is in the area of potentiality. He notes that it is through seeing what things in nature will inevitably become we come to conclude that nature has some type of direction or guidance. It is true that Aristotle has stated this before. But, Woodfield lays out the concept much more clearly.
“A flower, if it has the form of a rose, is a rose for that reason. Thus the form of a thing is intimately bound up with the idea of actuality and of being fully developed. Although a rosebud is not actually a rose, but only potentially, in calling it a bud of a rose we identify it in terms of what it is naturally going to become. To that extent the rosebud has potentially the form of a rose. “
While I apologize for the long block quote, it is of the utmost importance that this idea of potentiality gets fleshed out fully. For it is in this very idea of nature having potentiality that we come to think of nature as teleological at all and it is with this concept where my paper will begin.
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