Reasoning Cause and Effect

For my research presentation I plan to explore the plausibility of causal relations and especially their connection to biological evolution. I hope to examine the extent to which our understanding of cause and effect accurately reflect the nature of the universe. I intend to analyze the relationship between a cause and an effect to determine what, if anything, connects the two. In this way, I hope to gain a better insight into both the process of the universe and my own mode of thinking.

Bergson criticizes both teleology and mechanism because they inevitably conclude, “All is given.” If every cause can be traced to its effects or every effect traced to its causes then the entirety of the universe could be predetermined given sufficient information and the appropriate equations. If this were the case then time would be irrelevant because every effect would have essentially already happened. Bergson argues towards certain creative power in the world. He states, “this reality is undoubtedly creative, i.e. productive of effects in which it expands and transcends its own being” (52). The cause, while observable in the first place, refuses to reveal its consequences prematurely. The precise effect cannot be known until it has unfolded in time. Bergson continues, “These effects were therefore not given in it in advance, and so it could not take them for ends, although, when once produced, they admit of a rational interpretation” (ibid). Teleology breaks down, according to Bergson, because causes do not anticipate their effects. It is only after the effect has been observed that the causal relation may be analyzed.

Hume calls into question causal relation all together. In his opinion, “knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience” (27). Causal relations are not known except by observation. Hume states that the explosive property of gunpowder, for instance, could never “be discovered a priori” (28). The distinction between observation and reasoning is crucial. One must first experience a cause and effect before one can reason the connection. Reason comes secondary to observation. Hume writes, “A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?” (29). This demonstrates that the world is not based on reason, but rather reason is based on the world. Future effects cannot be predicted a priori but must be rooted in previous knowledge. Likewise, a novel effect presents itself unexpectedly, and it is only after the event that causal connections may be drawn.

This is perhaps most evident in the study of evolution. Bergson writes, “That the appearance of a vegetable or animal species is due to specific causes, nobody will gainsay. But this can only mean that if, after the fact, we could know these causes in detail, we could explain by them the form that has been produced; foreseeing the form is out of the question” (27). According to Bergson, evolution offers a creativity to which causes can be inferred but of which effects cannot be predicted. For this reason, evolution does not follow a mechanistic or finalistic system. Bergson offers a metaphor: “no one, not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced—an absurd hypothesis which is its own refutation” (6-7).

Though intelligence produced the theory of evolution, intelligence is itself an evolutionary adaption. Like any other adaptation, such as the ability to fly, man’s exceptional intelligence has allowed him to exploit a niche in nature. If intelligence is considered in the context of evolution then it is no more than an adaptation to improve our survival. The perception of cause and effect stems from the intellect. It is here that we must determine to what degree this evolutionary adaptation accurately captures the nature of the world. We have already said that a pure reasoning of the world ungrounded in observation would not align itself with the world as it is observed. Hume writes, “When we reason a priori, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them” (31). The relationship between cause and effect is essentially unknown to reason; reason can only observe the sequence and then attribute a connection.

The assumption that our perception of causes and effects accurately reflect the nature of the world has lead to the development of mechanical and teleological systems. However, we are the ones imposing causality on nature. When one observes an event in nature contrary to one’s understanding, one manipulates the evidence until it confines to reason. Hume states, “It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation” (30). We may find success in attributing causes to effects on a relative level, but this in no way implies the universality of a cause-effect based system. Hume continues, “But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them” (ibid). I propose that causal relations are not an absolute necessity, but only a useful understanding developed by the intellect through observation.

Heidegger video

Hey all i found the video that prof. Grady showed in class very interesting so i found the first part of it on Youtube. Its really good and done by the BBC so if you want to watch it here is the link.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xKhUyU8UQEI

Food for Thought: It’s not as Corny as this Title

Food for Thought:

It’s not as Corny as this Title

In the “Science and Philosophy” section of Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson discusses the topic of “positive science”, or the use of our intellect to create and make inventions. In this section, he claims that the human intellect is “at home” with inert, inorganic matter. Matter of this type is easier to comprehend the “inner nature of the inert matter” (Bergson 195). But when “the intellect undertakes the study of life, it necessarily treats the living like the inert, applying the same forms to this new object, carrying over into this new field the same habits that have succeeded so well in the old” (195). Living things are unpredictable, therefore we can’t ever claim to know “the inner nature” of the being, lest have control over it. However, the intellect has a disposition for looking at everything as unmoving and knowable objects. It is accustomed to do so most in part due to the fact that it is more advantageous for us to do so.

Bergson describes another characteristic of the human intellect in the earlier section, “The Function of the Intellect”. In the first part of the section, Bergson explicitly states that the intellect’s first aim is at constructing. And staying true to the claim that the intellect is most comfortable with inert matter, he states that this “fabrication is exercised exclusively on inert matter, in this sense that ever if it makes use of organized material, it treats it as inert, without troubling about the life which animated it” (153). The illusion that we can understand and predict the actions of living objects, combined with human being’s natural tendency to treat “the whole of matter … as an immense piece of cloth in which we can cut out what we will and sew it together again as we please” (156), have resulted in some pretty incredible discoveries and inventions, but also resulted in some advancements where the intellect got out of hand.

This last fact becomes more interesting when the reader considers that not only is the intellect an “organ” produced by evolution, it can help direct the process of evolution. While this might all sound like a bunch metaphysical jargon, it has its application in the real life. In the face of an obesity epidemic and a rising number of other health concerns that are related to our diet, lately people have been asked to think about the food that they eat. Whether they find out through TV Shows, or books, like Jonathan Safran Foer’s Eating Animals and Fast Food Nation, or films like Supersize Me and Food, Inc., people are learning about what they are putting in to their bodies and for the most part, are not pleased. Most of the shock comes from the discovery of the nutritional value (or lack thereof) in the food, but many others are appalled by the cause of the abhorrent quality of the food, the means of production.

In today’s market, much of the food has been modified one way or another. In the assembly line-production, consumer driven economy that we live in, all companies are pushed to make products bigger and better in the half the time. This is not so much a problem when humans are contained to inert, unorganized matter, but when humans run into trying to apply these standards to living matter, they run into a problem. And this is exactly the situation human beings are in regarding their current practices of mass-producing food. Before this era of food awareness and activism, the question may have seemed obsolete, but knowing what we know now about the production of our food, philosophy has once again come to the forefront of “real life” situations, when we, as many have (even perhaps without knowing they have done so) ask: What is metaphysically wrong about the way that food is being produced?

The production of genetically modified food by human beings is a perfect example of how the intellect tends to treat organisms as inert, predictable beings and exemplifies its inclination to fabricate new things from organized matter, without “troubling about the life which animated it”. Furthermore, when one considers once again that the intellect is an organ of evolution, which is able to direct evolution, one can see the correlation of how our inclination to direct evolution in a way that is preferable to us, without “troubling the life which animated it” could lead to some big problems. This in part due to the fact that the “…intelligence which aims at fabricating is an intelligence which never stops at the actual form of things, nor regards it as final, but on the contrary looks upon all matter if it were carvable at will” (156).

But not all objects are knowable, predictable, or “carvable at will”. We have tried to create an organism that is molded to our will. We have dissected, studied, analyzed, experimented, and theorized features of living beings and in essence tried to turn know everything about the living organism to the point where we “know” that if we add a certain element into an organism’s developmental process or modify this or that gene, we can produce a certain outcome, or a specific organism. We have “understood” the being so well, that we claim to have established a form of predictability in the objects that we have produced.

This desire for predictability, or longing for repetition is one of the other salient features of the intellect as described by Bergson. Much like the other features of the intellect, it has made its way from dealing only with inert objects to transferring its logic on to living organisms also. Scientists have successfully attempted to modify genes in a way that tomatoes grow bigger and redder, apples are hardier and taste sweeter and chickens that are meatier and mature in half the time. They have experimented to the point that they can predict that, when they change a certain element in one generation, it will have an effect in the future generations.

In essence they have attempted to create a perfect predictability, or finalism for the organism they are affecting. But, as Bergson says, we can never truly can predict the future, but furthermore, he claims that we try to modify organisms, without “troubling the life which animated it”. In a typical human manner, we placed ourselves in the focal point, and percieved that everything was suited for our ends, without thought to the greater good. If this is taken for true, than everything is an abomination, because we have actually changed the way that other things live. We not only alter the organisms individual life, but we alter life and the drive for evolution as a whole.

The one feature that causes life and evolution to continue on is the open-endedness of it all. There is no master plan, or final goal that life is striving for. But, by inserting ourselves in the course of evolution and altering life as we see fit, we could end up doing something highly-disadvantageous for the human race as a whole. We seek to cap the open-endedness of life and evolution without understanding, or even having the ability to understand it. If we try to control all aspects of life and evolution, and no check is put on our intellect, we may find ourselves once again in a society that accepts eugenics or ethnic cleansing.

For this paper, I will be focusing mainly on Bergson, put referencing other authors covered in the class where the information is relative. For my research I will be watching Food Inc, and reading Fast Food Nation and Eating Animals. I also intend to use Human Genome Project’s website for any technical or scientific information.

Natural Laws

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned primarily with investigating the nature of being. One of the most significant ideas metaphysics explores is movement, a theme that appears throughout the work of many distinguished philosophers. Many philosophers believe that causality, which examines the relationship between an event and its effect, plays an important role in analyzing the movement between natural beings. Aristotle introduces the idea of the “first mover,” who is responsible for setting all things in motion. The first mover comprehends the whole of being and cannot be influenced by any material being. Like traditional metaphysics, theology places the laws that govern nature outside of the material realm. Reality is found beyond the natural world, in what is eternal and unchangeable. Although theologians are able to integrate supernatural ideas into Aristotle’s metaphysics, this task proves more difficult with the ideas of Henri Bergson. Bergson believes that the laws that govern nature develop within nature, which is in a constant state of change. These contrasting ideas present a controversial topic within metaphysics. Should the laws of nature be included in the supernatural realm, or within the material world? Immanuel Kant, who tends to ground his philosophy in experience, seems to offer a solution to this controversial topic.
In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant explains that rational beings are inclined to promote the highest moral good (89). The “morally, well-disposed” man, however, faces a constant attack from the evil principle, which restricts his ability to perform ethical actions (85). The ultimate goal of the individual is to resist this evil and break free from the laws of sin. Kant believes that individuals are not evil by nature, rather, they are immoral only through their interaction with other members of society. Despite the good will of each individual, men make one another evil by corrupting each other’s moral predisposition (88). As a result, an individual that associates with others runs the risk of straying away from the good. Kant explains that, in order to obtain the highest moral good, individuals must form an alliance designed to further the good and protect man from the evil principle. The good principle is achievable through the creation of a society that is responsible for spreading moral laws throughout humanity. If mankind fails to create a society that aims “solely at the maintenance of morality,” then it will fall into the hands of evil (86).
Kant believes that humanity has the potential to become united under an “ethical commonwealth,” which consists of a union of men guided exclusively by laws of virtue (87). Unlike the members of a political state, who are subject to an external authority, the members of an ethical commonwealth have the power to advocate their own law. Although an ethical commonwealth is grounded in laws that are non-coercive, it may choose to accept a constitution based on public law. In order to be “ethical,” however, the laws of a commonwealth cannot be determined by its members. Public human laws are directed toward the legality of actions, rather than their inner morality (90). Kant believes that the concept of an ethical commonwealth can be extended to the whole of mankind because the duties of virtue apply to all human beings (88). He explains that an ethical society strives to attain harmony with all men by encouraging moral action. As members of this community, however, individuals are unable to overcome the forces that separate mankind and require something greater than themselves to help them establish a universal republic (90).
The establishment of a universal church involves a special combination of ecclesiastical faith and pure religious faith. Kant explains that the constitution of every church originates in ecclesiastical faith. “Ecclesiastical faith,” or historical faith, is dependent upon the conditions of experience (96). Although ecclesiastical faith is grounded in fact, it is subject to the circumstances of time or place and dependent on man’s ability to accurately judge certain situations. “Pure religious faith,” on the other hand, is a ”rational” faith that can be believed in and shared by everyone (94). Because rational beings understand their incapacity to understand the supersensible, a faith pertaining strictly to what is available through intuition is appealing to the senses. A church, however, must entertain the idea that its organization is a divine arrangement that is completely harmonious with moral religion (96). Similarly, human nature prevents the establishment of a church based on pure faith alone. In contrast to the faith established in tradition, the faith that is grounded in scripture endures through all objections and provides a pure doctrine of religion (98).
The idea that individuals are insufficient both in their inability to establish moral laws and unite mankind leads to the idea of a higher moral being who assists mankind with these tasks. This being is the one who “knows the heart” and is able to sense the personal temperament of each individual (91). Ethical laws originate from the will of this being, which determine the worth of human action. Kant explains that the divine, legislative will commands through purely moral laws (90). While the laws concerning the legality of actions serve as the means to spread religion, pure moral legislation constitutes all true religion (95). Kant believes that mankind should only be concerned with the ideas that are presented in a practical context. Kant believes that practical reason can morally comprehend the idea of god as the “holy Legislator,” “moral Guardian,” and “righteous Judge” (131). Human reason can understand the notion of god through these characteristics because it presents the moral relation of god to mankind. This description of god can be presented to human reason everywhere and is practical for the development of an ethical commonwealth.
Kant describes god as the “highest lawgiver of an ethical commonwealth” (90). Therefore, the people of an ethical commonwealth are considered a people of god. Kant explains that the organization of a people of god can only be realized in the form of a church. A “church visible,” in particular, is the actual union of men into a whole under “divine world-government” (92). The purpose of the church is grounded within the material realm. It is the responsibility of mankind to “exhibit the kingdom of God on earth” (92). The union of the church must be motivated by moral forces and the members of the church must be free from political authority. The members of a “true” church must also administer basic laws and principles that are consistent and unchangeable (93). Kant further explains that God is honored and glorified through an individual’s participation in a good course of life (96). Because it is impossible for man to have any influence on god, individuals must direct their actions towards mankind. An individual is “perpetually in the service of God” when they fulfill their duties to themselves and others (94).
Kant offers a solution to the controversy concerning where the laws that govern nature should be placed in the study of being. Kant explains that society, or an individual’s interaction with other men, naturally makes that individual corrupt and evil. He encourages humanity to strive to obtain the good, which can only be accomplished under an ethical commonwealth. In this type of society, a supreme being uses moral laws to direct mankind. An ethical commonwealth is dependent upon this holy legislator, who expresses his divine will through these laws and determines the “goodness” of human action. Kant further explains the significance of having faith in both the church and this higher moral being. An intimate connection between these two faiths is necessary for the establishment of a universal church. Kant, however, believes that these laws are only beneficial for creating a moral and virtuous society. Divine commandments are only significant if they are used to achieve ethical ends. Kant explains that an individual’s “service” to god involves fulfilling his duties toward other men. Because mankind can only influence what is found in the natural world, an individual must avoid acting for the supernatural. Similarly, in order for the laws of nature to have any influence on mankind, they must be located within the material realm.

Ethics and Metaphysics

Within Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, there seems to be two aspects of metaphysics that are being called into questioned. First, there is the idea of the three different realms and the type of world these three spheres are situated within and the experiences they create. These realms are in a specific context, which develops the metaphysical ideas of the type of nature where human beings live. In conjunction, Kierkegaard’s work calls into question the metaphysics as a singular form of experience as a being. To fully understand “being qua being” in the world, Kierkegaard suggests that one must look at the metaphysics in conjunction with the ethics. Metaphysics and ethics are inseparable when trying to understand humans in the world. Searching for the metaphysical questions that we have been discussing in class such as what it means to be, how it varies in form, and studying what is cannot be fully explored or understood without considering the ethics. For Kierkegaard, metaphysics and ethics cannot be drawn out as singular matters to consider, but rather they should be seen in correlation to one another. In support, I will be reviewing Kant’s third antinomy. There are four antinomies where he considers two contrasting ideas. He accounts for their differences, but is able to connect them in some regard. The third antinomy is the one of most importance for my thesis. It discusses nature and freedom, which parallels my ideas of metaphysics and ethics. Also in support, an article in International Journal of Ethics titled Ethics and Metaphysics is written by Dorothy Walsh who attempts to show not only that “ethics… has its metaphysical presuppositions.” It is not only a matter of considering them as being connected, but she seems to question how much ethics depends on metaphysics.

My first primary source is Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. As discussed, the first metaphysical aspect called into question is the nature of the environment in which we live. The study of what is revolves around the type of environment that we are placed within. (This is the first step in recognizing the connection between metaphysics and ethics.) There are three realms according to Kierkegaard that we exist in the world. First, there is the aesthetic realm. This deals with individual relationships on a personal level such as an inside joke or a common understanding in a relationship. The next realm is the ethical, which holds universal understanding such as judgments, rules and laws. The final realm is the religious, which is an actual relationship with God. Kierkegaard uses these realms to identify the Biblical relationship between Abraham and God. In the story, God calls upon Abraham to sacrifice his one and only son. Having faith in the Lord, Abraham obeys what the Lord has asked and takes Isaac to the top of the mountain to be sacrificed. This act has been used by many scholars as a reference to absolute faith, which is taking the “what is” of the situation and calling it into question due to the lack of understanding of the world. Normally, we perceive things through the universal, even our relationship with God. Kierkegaard wants to ask the question of whether the universal can be completely overlooked and there can be a direct relationship with God. This would alter our general understanding of the world, and it would seem that to do this would correlate not only to the way of acting in the world, but how and why one acts in the world drawing on the ethics of the situation. To clarify, the ethics are a large part of being in the world when we look at the story not as mere facts, but the truth of the situation. Kierkegaard asks how this can be a true testament of faith, when ethically it is so wrong. The perspective of the world and the moral duties of a father and of a religious leader of God seem to encompass both metaphysical questions and ethical questions.

My next source will be Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where he attempts to settle the question of freedom verse the idea that everything is determined by nature. He goes on to define the what he means by freedom and nature. He says that the laws of nature are only significant in space and time; therefore, they are valid in their appearance. Freedom is existing outside the confines of experiences; therefore, they only apply to things within themselves. Yet, the overarching theme appears that reason excludes the idea of experience. There is a more indepth analysis which will be covered in my paper, but essentially Kant gets to the point that humans can be free and can also be subjected to the confinements of the natural world. His analysis is another attempt to show that freedom, an ethical question, is inseparable from the metaphysical question such as the laws of nature.

Another one of my sources comes from the International Journal of Ethics. Dorthy Walsh writes on Ethics and Metaphysics. She does not question whether or not they are used in conjunction, but rather how much they overlap. Her question is along the lines of how much of ethical questions are reliant upon metaphysics. There seems to be a dependency of ethics and this could create a whole new form of inquiry. So many times, philosophers try to separate these questions into epistemological, logical, metaphysical, when in reality by taking them out of the realm of the whole they miss a large part of the experience or knowledge they are trying to gain. It is through this paper that I am going to attempt to show the importance of keeping an open mind when studying the philosophical questions. Although it is convenient to analyze one aspect at a time, it significantly alters how something should b perceived in reality. Through Kierkegaard’s example of Abraham and God situated within the different realms and supported by many other philosophers work, I will attempt to show that the ethics and metaphysics are inseparable when analyzing these forms of knowledge.

Kant's "Nature" and Apriori Rules of Morality

While Aristotle would posit that humans and human sensibility are necessarily in harmony with the natural world, as it exists in actuality, Kant would argue to the contrary claiming we can have no “true” knowledge of objects in and of themselves. Kant asserts that the apriori formal conditions of our knowledge, namely space and time, allow us to intuit only those objects that conform to these apriori conditions. However, despite the fact that we can only intuit “representations” we nonetheless know that something must be responsible for the representation, namely the object in and of itself, so that our existence can still be considered as grounded in an objective reality. Accordingly, we too are subject to the apriori universal laws of nature that govern the sensible world. While our sensible intuitions and representations of the understanding must remain grounded in actual experience, as humans, and therefore rational beings, we are also endowed with the faculty of reason. In the final sections of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he shows the tendency of reason to always seek the unconditioned. However, because we can never sensibly intuit the unconditioned, reason by its very nature continually attempts to overstep its limitations.  This is highlighted in the third antimony that shows how reason, when overstepping its limits, can lead to two contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, human freedom is necessary in regards to moral responsibility, but thereby creates a “lawlessness” and disunity of experience as it breaks the tie between cause and effect by allowing for spontaneity. On the other hand, if the universal laws of nature are all that govern the universe, there becomes an issue of infinite regress towards the unconditioned, something that reason by its very nature tends towards but can have no validated experience of.

While Kant leaves us at this seemingly irreconcilable divide between human freedom and the mechanistic laws of nature in his Critique of Pure Reason, he picks this concept back up in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and subsequently argues that the concept of morality can be found apriori in the faculty of reason.

Within his argument the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals he divides beings into two groups, non-rational and rational. He then defines human beings as a subset of rational beings that are a part of the intelligible world, but also necessarily tied to the sensible world. It is this dualistic nature that allows us to act freely and autonomously with regards to the intelligible world yet still be bound to the determinate laws of nature which govern our sensible world. Furthermore, because we are creatures of the sensible world we have desires, inclinations and sensations that oftentimes influence our actions, of which we freely choose. However, actions made solely for satisfying some desire or inclination of our own are not moral. Morality is defined as a duty of rational beings to act “as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (Groundwork, p. 31) and “act that you use your humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Groundwaork, p. 38). So that one must first consider if one’s actions could be viewed as universally applicable and second, assure oneself that humanity is not being used as a means of achieving one’s goal. This is because to use another person would be to encroach upon their autonomy and would therefore undermine the value of your own autonomy and human freedom in general.

Kant’s discussion of the tension between efficient causes of the natural world on sensible beings and the necessity of human freedom for autonomous rational beings raises many questions:

How is “nature” defined and what is our relation to it? Is there a distinction between the natural world and human nature (humanity)? If so, what is human nature? How does the presupposition of our relation to nature necessarily affect any metaphysical argument? How is the sensible world different from the intelligible world? What is the status given to the idea of autonomy and independence within the field of metaphysics generally? If we are a part of the natural world, are we ascribed a particular status in relation to other objects?

In regards to Kant’s delineation of “non-rational” and “rational” beings, an article by Allen Wood focuses on the ethical concerns of the treatment of non-rational beings. In other words, according to Kant’s argument, are we required to treat animals and nature as a whole with respect or, as seems the case, can we use them indiscriminately as means for achieving our own ends? Wood argues that the central problem is “Kant regards only rational beings as persons, which are not to be treated as ends, regarding all other beings as things” (Wood, 193). However, Wood believes Kant’s principles which require a duty of humans to respect humanity “as the ultimate end of nature” implicitly require that “we undertake the responsibility of shaping our ends in such a way that hey provide this system [ecosystem] with its […] harmony”(Wood, p. 204). In short, Wood is skeptical of the implications Kant’s Formula of Humanity could have, namely rational beings could merely use nature as they please, but ultimately believes Kant’s arguments, when taken as a whole, support efforts to preserve the natural world.

While the previous article analyzes the relationship between non-rational and rational beings, Michael Nelson’s article focuses on the interpersonal relationships of rational beings as a group. In attempts to better understand the actual ways in which Kant’s Formula of Humanity could be implemented socially, Nelson looks to Kant’s Formula of Autonomy and Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. Nelson proposes that because “rational agents can coordinate plans both intrapersonally and interpersonally” that Kant is really keying in on an “idea of social cooperation […] flexible enough to allow a variety of different, specific realizations” (Nelson, p. 105).  In short, Nelson argues that it is not simply enough to value humans because they can, as autonomous beings, generate their own ends, but more importantly these ends under social and political contracts can be harmonized and mutually beneficial. Kant’s morality as interpreted by Nelson, “requires an ongoing process of give-and-take, mutual adjustment”( Nelson, p. 101).  I would argue, however, against Nelson’s argument as I believe Kant would not refer to the laws of morality as a “process of give-and-take” to be adjusted relative to the individuals in question. Morality as viewed by Kant is a set of ahistorical, apriori rules necessitated by our faculty of reason (or more importantly the reason of any rational being). For humans, who must operate in both the sensible and intelligible world, the Kingdom of Ends is a mere ideal as the human race can never be expected to follow the categorical imperatives of morality as a necessary set of rules. We as a autonomous beings have choices and are influenced not only by moral duty, but also by sensible desires and the two cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at all times. 

The other secondary sources to be used address the Kantian relationship between reason, morality, freedom. These articles “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”, “Kant’s Anti-determinism” and “The Value of Reason and the Value of Freedom”, all offer analysis of the seemingly paradoxical idea that it is within our autonomous freedom that we discover the apriori laws of morality. In brief, Kant’s argument follows that if we have reason, we must suppose ourselves to be self-causing and therefore “free” and autonomous. However, if we believe ourselves to be autonomous it none-the-less follows that we must accept the autonomy of all other rational beings. Therefore, we are morally obligated to respect humanity as an end (self-determining) and never as a means so that dignity is only achieved when we act in ways that would be deemed universally applicable.      

While the main thesis is not yet refined, the central focus of the paper will be to elaborate on the concept of “nature” in reference to both the efficient laws of nature of which we are bound by the sensible world as well as the laws of morality of which we are bound by the intelligible world. Furthermore to fully understand Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it is important to elaborate on his division of non-rational and rational beings as well as his differentiation of a purely rational being and a human being.

 

Duration

Henri Bergson begins the first chapter of his book Creative Evolution with a reflection on time and how individuals perceive it. He asserts that the way science looks at time as a series of individual moments that are possible to differentiate is wrong. Bergson believes this because experiences build upon each other and no two instances are exactly alike. Instead Bergson would have individuals perceive time as states that move from one to the next continuously, each state building upon all the other states that preceded it. Why do we describe time and change in this abstract and, in Bergson’s opinion, incorrect manner? If Bergson is correct then our understanding of the world around us and how we perceive things may have to change.
When describing how things change, people generally indicate points on a timeline at and identify them as when something became something else; this is especially true of evolution. Scientists identify points in time and define what the organism was then. Organisms are said to be one thing at this time and then become another at that time. Bergson points out is that the problem with this method is that these organisms didn’t just become these new species all of a sudden, as it might suggest. Instead things change gradually over time, slowly changing from one form to the next. A fish did not just wake up one day and become able to survive on land, instead each generation of fish changed slightly from the one before it. Every generation built upon the growth of its ancestors, the progeny consistently overcoming the parents.
Our lifetimes can be perceived a similar way. If one reflects on themselves as a child, one can instantly see how he is different now than he was then. While we are different than we were previously, we are undeniably still the same person throughout our lifetimes. So is there an identifiable point at which each one of became the man or woman we are today? Certainly not; we would instead say that we gradually grew and changed to become the person we are today. As organisms there is no stop to our change. We change continuously at the same rate, each moment we experience building upon the last, our intellect revising as necessary according to new information. This continual change is what Bergson describes as duration.
Duration is not just the replacing of each instant with the next. Nothing is being replaced and everything continues to have an effect. Each moment is influenced by the one that preceded it such that each moment builds upon what every moment that preceded it started. Bergson describes duration excellently as “…the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances” (4). This description brings to mind the idea of the “snowball effect”. Each moment that passes is added onto our snowball of experience and influences every moment that follows.
Understanding the past might inform our actions in the present, but an experience can never be repeated twice even with the same conditions present, and as such it is impossible to foretell the future. Since each experience builds upon all the ones that preceded it, even if we are presented with the same circumstances of an experience a second time, we will not have the same experience as our previous experience of the same circumstance because the first one informs the new one. As such, even if we could possibly know all the variables in the equation of experience, we would still not know what will come. Bergson describes this occurrence by relating it to the painting of a portrait: even if one know what the model, background, canvas, paints and brush look like, no one, not even the painter himself , can possibly know how the portrait will turn out. To foretell the future is to try and indentify what we have not experienced by way of what we have already experienced, which are necessarily different.
Bergson ends his section on duration with a thought on existence: “…we find that, for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly. Should the same be said of existence in general?” (7). When we exist, we take part in duration necessarily, which means we are constantly changing. What changes us are new experiences that inform our understanding and improve our abilities. As such, to change is to mature. As we mature we recreate ourselves better than before. Bergson ends by asking us whether we can describe existence as this progress, and it appears we can.
If Bergson is correct and we start looking at our own existence in this fashion, it appears we have only to gain from it. Instead of constantly living in the present, individuals would look to the past to inform their present actions. This act can only make the future of one’s existence better. If we keep in mind that every experience builds upon the ones that preceded it then we will make sure to do the best we can with every experience. The reason we gain from this practice is that our futures can only get better if we improve our pasts.
As was previously described, our experiences of the past are constantly trying to overflow into our present. What is meant by that is our past cannot be stopped from influencing our present actions. Our past experiences are preserved in how they influence our later experiences. Therefore every experience informs our mental capacity and improves our means. If we make sure to have informative experiences as often as possible, then just as the past pushes into the present, our new improved intellects will inform our present without effort.
If we are to take up Bergson’s ideas on duration and how we experience, then we will be forced to change how we consider experience and education. This is not a bad thing though, as it should surely improve how we grow and improve our intellects and abilities. However it seems a difficult task to drastically change how we perceive the world.

Time

As we have studied the metaphysics of many philosophers this semester, the theme of time has presented itself over and over. We have seen many differing conceptions of time, invariably shaped by and informing the metaphysics of those who espouse them. I have found thus far these theories of time unsatisfying. Some seem overly simple streams of moments, while others vague flowing abstractions that flee understanding. I hope in this paper to examine a number of theories of time, that I may better understand them and move toward my own theory of time.

Aristotle's metaphysics is a teleological one. His beings are driven by purpose and potential. He cites a being's natural state as at rest, but notes the abundance of change occurring. In Aristotle, we find that time can have no beginning or end, yet we have the Prime Mover. Aristotle's account of time invariably incorporates his teleological yet oddly mechanistic account of causation. I hope in my paper to better understand Aristotle's account of time, either through a review of his Metaphysics or exploration into his other works (notably his Physics).

Leibniz's mechanism suggests a largely chronological consideration of time, rather one composed of moments. However his determinism (like most determinisms) brings into question the very existence of time. If the future can be determined by the present, which could be fully gleaned from the past, is there any true differentiation between these "moments" of time? I hope to more clearly state the implications of both determinism and mechanism upon time, using Leibniz as a jumping board.

In Kant, we find time as a necessary condition of knowledge, therefore inherent in all thought. But this omnipresent time, is it "real" or "ideal"? (This debate I draw from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "Kant's Views on Space and Time") While I have yet to resolve this question myself, I hope to both get Kant's view on this and provide my own should it (as is likely) differ from his. From here, I may include exploration of A-series and B-series modes of time, and how the texts and I personally conceive time.

Bergson provides perhaps the most appealing conception of time amongst the texts we’ve read. He fights against the urge to examine time in its moments, calling such cinematographic separation arbitrary and false. He keenly notes that in the name of looking at time, we often stop it, hardly a foolproof method for gaining truth. I feel Bergson’s look at time places a premium on context, something I value in all forms of philosophic inquiry and strive to include in my own theory.

Conceptions of time are incredibly susceptible to human biases or fears. I think many conceptions of time are greatly influenced by human fears or hopes, such as those regarding mortality, shared experience, and natural order. I hope to elucidate where these influences upon theories of time are positive or damaging, logical or unjustly invested. Ultimately, time is a difficult subject to examine, as it is so intertwined to human action, experience, and thought. My ambitious aims to conclude my project include exploring Heidegger's inquiries into Being and Time, and articulating a personal understanding of time. On the way to forming such an understanding, I hope to learn from the philosophers we have studied while using some modern science as a foil for my thoughts. One text I enjoy and hope to use in considering some of the more bizarre scientific findings on time is Stephen Hawking's Brief History of Time. In summary, I plan to follow these routes of inquiry toward a coherent and focused consideration and thesis of time.

Ever Changing Markets

Earlier in my experience of Rhodes I intended to become an economics major. I later decided to abandon a major in economics in favor of one in philosophy. Though I am no longer majoring in economics I have not lost my interest in it. Ironically, in many ways philosophy has enhanced my understanding of economics in a way that I would not have found in a strictly economics focus.
Philosophy is the quintessential liberal arts subject because it is concerned with knowledge, the basis for all other subjects. The distinction and disciplines of the sciences, arts, and all of their subsections is a purely artificial distinction. I, just as philosophy, am concerned with the seams of learning, the places where one subject is connected to another, in this instance the intersection between economics and philosophy.
The intersection between philosophy and economics is quite extensive, and so in my research paper I wanted to focus specifically on how Bergson’s idea of flux and ever changing laws and facts relates to economies and markets. Bergson’s ideas fit naturally into economics, specifically a free market view because they preclude any effective central planning.
Markets are an example of spontaneous order, and just like nature they are in constant flux. A key to a successful business is finding a niche in a market, but they key to maintaining a successful business is constantly adapting to the ever changing market. A visualization of this concept could be some sort of fluid puzzle in which the pieces were continuously changing shape and so forcing you to constantly adapt yourself to fit within the fluid model.
My first source is Bergson’s creative evolution. In my paper, markets behave like Bergson describes nature, a constant flux. It is tempting, especially to economists, to claim that with enough information they can predict the future of a market. It might initially seem that once the rules of economics are understood that if enough factors can be known the market can be predicted. This is not so, the flaw in thinking resides in the idea that the laws and factors are static, and can so be used to accurately predict the future of market.
The inability to predict the future of a market is driven at the most basic level by understanding the market to any degree. By measuring the market we change it, much like our inability to know the speed and location of a particle because by measuring it we alter its location or speed. So to by measuring a market and acting on that information do we alter the market. A good example of this would be the stock market where knowing the price of something, or knowing some information about a company in the market will actually change the market.
So how are we to respond and operate in a market with an unpredictable future? The second source I am using is The Art of the Long View by Peter Schwartz. Schwartz proposes a system of probably planning in order to deal with an ever changing and unpredictable model.
Schwartz suggest creating a frame work of possible solutions and developing options that contain in themselves solutions to multiple possible futures. Using this method one can have a variety of options each which can be adopted to a variety of possible futures allowing one plan somewhat effectively for an unpredictable future.
In dealing with Bergson’s ideas in general and specifically how they apply to economics it is important not to improperly emphasize the rapidity of changing laws and factors. While some factors may change at extremely fast rates, not all of them will, and the majority of the laws the govern and are influenced by the factors will be even lest quick to change. Schwartz recognizes this and makes comment by saying that while much of the future is unclear, there are certain immediate factors which will very probably happen. The example that he gives is that if it rains in the Himalayas then it will flood in the Ganges river.
Following this analogy we find that while much of the future is unpredictable some things in markets can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy even if by acting on these probably events the markets themselves are changed.
My third source is Sigmund Freud Civilization and its Discontents . while Schwartz’s writings deal with the chaos of markets on a very practical level, Freud’s work as parallels the markets in the dynamic model he proposes of desire and the means by which we seek to satisfy them. There is a certain view of economics that claims that we have set needs, and on these constants we can begin to predict markets. The problem with this economics perspective is that it assumes that our desires are independent of the objects they pursue, making them static.
Freud however disagrees with this model of desires and objects. He proposes, in a similar line of reasoning to Bergson, that our desires are modified by the objects the pursue, as well as the reciprocal being true. In this model there is dynamic nature which defies prediction.
Freud and his work are important to consider because it focuses on the concept of flux at a very abstract and conceptual level. This abstract level is also the most basic level for practical applications. Dealing with these concepts at the abstract, or basic level, allows us the examine the concepts free of their practical actuation which can be distracting and limiting at times. Examining things at the conceptual level also affords a fresh perspective from which new patterns may be discovered and examined.
Markets are a spontaneous order that is in a constant flux. It is impossible to predict a market just by discovering all of the factors because the factors are constantly changing and modifying the laws that govern them. This model is reflected in Freud’s work Civilization and its Discontents with his argument about desires and their relation to objects . Peter Schwartz in his book The Art of the Long View discuses solutions and manners in which one can deal with an ever changing market.

Causation and an Environmental Ehtic

We have read a great deal on causal theories and how they relate to the nature of being over the course of the semester. In my research paper, I would like to explore these theories, what they reveal about our conception of nature, and through that conception, determine any ethical obligations we as humans might have to protect/respect the world in which we take part. Starting with causal theories, I intend to look at what we have read from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, as well as Bergson’s Creative Evolution. Additionally, I will be using Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac.

Beginning with teleology according to Aristotle, one of the ways in which a thing can change is through the actualizing of its potential. Simply, everything in nature, indeed nature itself, is drawn to a final cause. Individually, everything is naturally pulled to its own “telos” or end which is the greatest good that the thing has the potential to achieve. What I want to address here is whether or not all things, living and nonliving, are working/pulled towards their own ends (good), and whether or not it would be considered unethical to interrupt a being’s process of achieving that end. Under an ethic based on teleologic causation, would we be obligated to preserve the teleological efforts of all beings or would this be limited to other humans, sentient beings, non-sentient living beings, or extended to all things? In other words, should a thing be aware, either consciously or sentiently of its prevention from achieving its telos in order to be ethically protected?

Next, I intend to explore Bergson’s Creative Evolution, and more specifically his answer to the problem of causation, vitalism. Bergson first rejects both mechanism (which I am choosing to ignore in my paper on the grounds that, by positing that all things strictly adhere to the laws of nature, no room is left for morality) and radical teleology based upon his conception of nature as an undetermined, self-moving creative process which is capable of producing completely original entities. Vitalism explains causation as an expanding force without a set end to dictate its direction and natural laws are changing are not absolute, but changing along with the ceaselessly changing world they attempt to explain. Bergson gives the example of a river, constantly flowing, and upon meeting an obstacle, splitting, but not ceasing. And while there is no set purpose nor specific direction towards which evolution is drawn by some end, one might consider that its only desire (for lack of a better word) is to continue in its exponential progression.

What I would like to look at, concerning vitalism, is the question of what degree of manipulation humans have on the process of evolution. Are we merely obstacles of the river of evolution from which it can easily pass by, unscathed, or are we damming it up so that it is reduced to a stream, in danger of drying up? Additionally, Bergson tells us that science, by nature, “treats the living like the inert, applying the same forms [as inorganic matter].” If, through our industrial society and our perception of living things as objects for our benefit, we are narrowing the course of evolution by systematically removing species after species, are we obliged to change our ways in order to revive biodiversity? Should we be concerned with the species themselves or ecosystems as a whole? Should we be allowed to treat animals, plants and ecosystems as objects of our own convenience and pleasure?

This is where Leopold’s “The Land Ethic,” which is contained in A Sand County Almanac, would come into play. Leopold, an American naturalist of the 20th century, describes the world in a way that is not far from Bergson’s conception of life: everything, living and nonliving, is connected--man as a part of the biotic community. In “The Land Ethic,” Leopold sets out to create an ethic which puts limits on “freedom of action in the struggle for existence.” His land ethic, I think, should prove useful in answering the questions in the above paragraph, and might provide one solution t0 our stranglehold on evolutionary progress.

Kant Vs. Bergson Religion

Kant’s Summum Bonum VS. Bergson

In class we learned that Kant said that trying to rationally prove God would be fruitless attempt by our rationality. However while this is true, he later returns to the idea of God and an immortal soul in order to help back his ethical theory. Kant and Bergson disagree on many levels in their philosophy. When comparing and contrasting Kant’s idea of God and the Summum Bonum with the ideas of Bergson in Two Sources of Morality and Religion, we see many differences between the two philosophers, and many things that Bergson would criticize Kant for. Bergson creates an idea of a Static religion, which to him is inferior to his other idea of Dynamic religion. Kant’s beliefs in God has many similarities to Bergson’s ideas of Static religion, which shows a criticism of Kant’s way of thinking. Bergson offers a different idea of Dynamic religion as a superior alternative to Kant’s beliefs which allows for evolution, an idea essential to Bergson.

Kant believes that the ultimate Goal of rational beings is the Summum Bonum or Highest good. It is the goal of rational beings, and it is the way of life necessary for happiness. However it is not the concept of happiness that we normally think of. Instead what Kant is saying is that following the categorical imperative and achieving the Summum Bonum allows us to be worthy of happiness. It is still possible to be a completely moral agent, and not be happy. He merely is saying that those who are moral should be the only ones worthy of being happy. The Summum Bonum does not teach people how to be happy, it merely teaches them how to be good and worthy of a pleasurable life.

Kant believes in a Deontological philosophy based on reason, however he admits in his book that in order for people to achieve the Summum Bonum or highest good as it is translated there must be a God and an immortal soul. A short summary of Kant’s argument would be that as rational beings, we are morally obligated to achieve the highest moral good. (This argument is made because to Kant morality is derived from rationality). He then argues that for there to be a highest Good there must be an omnipotent and all knowing God that gives moral order to the Universe. He says that “this Divine Being must be omnipotent, in order that the whole nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to his will; omniscient, that He may know our innermost sentiments and their moral worth [this is because moral worth is tied in with our intent and natural tendencies as they stand with duty]; omnipresent, that he may be immediately at hand for satisfying of every need which the highest good demands; eternal, that this nature and freedom ma never fail, etc.” (Kant 642). Therefore in order to strive for the Summum Bonum we must postulate a God as the source of it. He says that throughout time “it was moral ideas that gave rise to the concept of Divine Being that we now hold to be correct” (Kant 643). Without a divine being to bring order to things his system of ethics falls begins to fall apart. His concept of God exists to bring moral order to society. Without God there would therefore be no morality.

This is an idea similar to Bergson concept of Static religion. Bergson defines two types of religion that are both important in society. The first of which is Static religion, and it has some similarities to Kant’s argument. “Static religion … attaches man to life, and consequently the individual to society by telling him tales on a par with those with which we lull children to sleep” (Bergson 200). Bergson says that in a system of closed morality, or unadapting morality, there needs to be a system that prevents people from questioning the system and defying the laws that hold that society together. He says that in static religions myths are created that create Gods and immortal souls that promise reward or punishment in regular life, or the afterlife. These religions say that a higher presence watches them and upholds the doctrine of morality. In a static religions Gods are used as to create standards as ways of life that man should follow. These gods thwart our “intelligence” when it tends to stray and think of ideas that could possibly upset the social order. Bergson believes that facts influences our beliefs, our philosophy, and even our conception of natural laws. Meaning that if an intelligent person gathers certain facts it can change the whole society, because “nothing can resist facts” (Bergson 99). Bergson says that “myths” or hallucinations of facts are created in this type of religion to preserve society; “if intelligence was to be kept at the outset from sliding down a slope which was dangerous to the individual and society, it could be only by the statement of apparent fact, by the ghosts of facts; failing real experience, a counterfeit of experience had to be conjured up” to prevent this (Bergson 99). To prevent people from straying away and using true facts to change society, the myths and Gods in this society create opposing facts to prevent people from straying and using those ideas. It is easy how another parallel to Kant can be made here. In a static religion new ideas that question the standards already set up in that society like morality and other ideas are demonized. According to Bergson Static religion is a completely closed system. This is similar to Kant, not only is God or the divine in charge of handling morality and upholding it in both theories, both Kant and Static religions are in closed systems. Kant’s system of morality does not allow for any moral deviation from the categorical imperative, anything that does so is immoral. Also, since Kant separates science from philosophy and denies scientific knowledge that might change his philosophy, it makes it seem like Kant’s idea of God could be a Static religion. No matter how the times change, to Kant what is moral and immoral remains the same. It is the same thing in a static religion. Anybody that comes up with ideas that differ from the preset norms, or do not follow the norms are demonized. Bergson says that these are created because of The Gods in both these uphold the current norms against all others. As you can see though there are many parallels to between Kant and static religion.

Bergson later in the book describes is superior alternative known as dynamic religion, which, unlike static religion which is based on supposed rules or laws of nature that repress new thought and facts, is actually based on evolution, intelligence, and creativity as he mentions in Creative Evolution. In this he mentions that in Dynamic religion, religion must be based on actual experiences felt by people in that society. He uses an example of Christian saints, or prophets when describing this. To Bergson Dynamic religion is based off of actual experiences. Because it is a religion based on actual experiences it allows for change. Dynamic religion does not make up false experiences to prevent actual contrary experiences, like static religion. It simply relies on the actual. These people who experienced the true mystical experiences are also capable to spread it around and inspire others to find actual relations with God. Bergson mentions the saints as an example of this. Their actual experiences with God allowed them to help inspire others to the Christian Faith. Bergson finds this form of religion superior because it is based on actual experience; it is not based on preventing other from doing things or expanding their intelligence to other areas. It allows for evolution of ideas and society. One can say that there is an example of this in the bible. At first followers of Jesus were chastised for breaking from the current norm, but through an actual encounter with God they were able to make Christianity spread. They were able to evolve beyond what people who hold to only traditional ideas of religion at the time believed. Allowing for new intelligence allowed for new ideas to form and for religion to evolve.

It is clear that Kant and Bergson have many differences in their beliefs. What Kant believes is necessary in the Summum Bonum contradicts greatly with many ideals held by Bergson. These differences seem be the same as their disagreements in Creative Evolution, stemming from Kant’s desire for fixed ideas and Bergson’s plea for the need of evolution.

Time (sans parsley, sage, and rosemary)

Time is a tricky thing, though not a “thing” in a metaphysical sense. Some would try to mystify it as such, to turn it solid—or, perhaps more fittingly, liquid. Some would even take it a step further and try to control it with the aid of science-fiction and the theoretical ramifications of relativity. Fortunately, faster-than-light travel is still impossible, and humanity is yet safe from temporal anomalies. However, it is equally strange when some make the claim that time doesn’t exist at all. What do they mean by this? It is probably true that time is not a thing itself, but to attempt to use the same vocabulary we ascribe to actual things—“existence” or the lack thereof—is simply inappropriate considering the word “time” itself. After all, “time” is merely a succinct word for the natural phenomenon of the earth rotating around the sun. Still, philosophers and crackpots alike have a peculiar fondness with trying to explain the nature of time. Metaphysicians, too, have frequently explored the subject in their individual explanations on the nature of “being” itself. This has produced several different interpretations, approaches, and interesting thought exercises; which explanation is best or, at least, the most useful? Both Emanuel Kant and Henri Bergson would seem to have very different accounts on the nature of time, but the major difference is in their respective approaches. Kant provides a very fitting explanation of how time appears to work for humans in his discourse on the nature of human reason. Bergson, on the other hand, more adequately describes the actual nature of the world as constantly in motion, or in “flux,” to use his terminology. However, both philosophers, as well as those who came before and after them, provide useful accounts of what this whole “time” business is all about.

The basic premise of my research topic would be to examine the different ways metaphysicians have approached the subject of “time” throughout the evolution of the discipline. Besides simply enumerating the different interpretations, I want to focus on how, exactly, each philosopher uses the subject in their overall arguments and how convincing their approach to time is. This would involve raising possible objects as well as acknowledging each argument’s strengths. A logical starting point would be the works of Aristotle, but I don’t really recall there being any in-depth discussion of “time” therein. This might not be a problem, however, if I start by examining how the common man thought about time over the course of history. I wouldn’t go too in-depth; I would simply take into consideration how people kept track of time and how their ability to do so improved. Initially, one would assume, man merely paid attention to the sun’s relative position in the sky, acknowledging that there were regular intervals of light and dark. Eventually, sundials were developed, followed by more and more sophisticated means of dividing the interval between each of the earth’s rotations. It took awhile for them to realize that this was, in fact, what brought about the phenomenon of “days,” but that’s beside the point.

So far, the most useful example of how the passage of time appears to humans is found in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason.” Because we can remember what we were doing the last time the earth rotated around its axis, the concept of “the past” is readily understandable. Likewise, we tend to be preoccupied with what is yet to come after the next rotation, so we have the concept of “the future.” Of course, we can only ever inhabit the present, a fact I’ll explore later in the paper. The focus of this section is simply of Kant’s conception of time as the “inner sense” of the human mind: singular yet divisible—there are no “times”—infinite, and one-dimensioned. As it appears to us, we can only move forward through time, unless any of the aforementioned science-fiction theories turn out to be possible. If interpreted incorrectly, one could raise a few objections. Is time actually infinite or divisible? However, Kant’s point is that it cannot appear to work in any other way due to the structure of human reason, which, common sense dictates, is certainly true. While there are possible objections raised by Kant’s explanation of said structure, his overall argument is not within the scope of this paper.

When it comes to the question of how time actually works, I believe Bergson offers the best explanation. With his interest in genetics and evolution, he sees the world and all beings in a constant process of change—what he calls “flux.” His overall criticism of science’s tendency to describe every minute detail of a given object or process, failing to really expand our understanding of said object in and of itself, applies to time as well. Whereas science tries to freeze a given moment of time—or a particular facet of an object—in order to study it and understand it, it ignores the fact that time itself never freezes. It is the continual process of the earth revolving around the sun and itself. However, he does not think that we should do away with watches, clocks, or even sundials. Our intellect cannot help but study things in a scientific way, and it is actually useful to do so. This is obvious to anyone who tries to organize an event, such as a philosophy class. Our division of a single rotation of the earth around its axis into hours, minutes, and seconds allows us to more easily comprehend a given stage in the earth’s rotation as a given time; then, we’ll know when during said rotation we need to show up in a given class room. This is in keeping with Bergson’s belief that scientific thought is a good thing as long as we realize that it does not adequately explain the true nature of the world.

Judging by the title of Heidegger’s work which we are yet to read, it seems like he will be another useful lens through which to examine the subject of “time.” However, as I have not started reading him yet, I have no idea exactly what he will contribute to my overall project. I have also come across a few other philosophical considerations and arguments about time that may be of use for this project. One of the main debates of the nature of time is the spilt between those who believe that there was a past, is a present, and will be a future and those who believe that time has no tense, that it simply appears to because of how our brains view causes and effects. However, there are many pseudo-mystical explanations involved with some of these arguments that may simply bog down my topic in thought experiments. While these arguments are certainly entertaining, they attempt to approach time from outside the human experience, which really isn’t all that useful. They seem to try to turn time into a thing in and of itself when it is basically a word created by people to encompass the ceaseless motion of the earth and—more broadly—the universe. If we could examine the entirety of existence in a semi-godlike fashion (i.e. see everything, but through a human perspective), an individual action on earth would most likely coincide with whatever else is happening in the ever-present now. If, on the other hand, the past and future exist alongside the present (as some believe) and God is able to see it all, such a sight would surely blow our fucking minds. However, this thought process raises a whole slew of arguments about the possibility/nature of such a being and the actual nature of existence. Such considerations are simply outside the scope of my topic, any answers outside of the scope of human reason.

Theism and Atheism

In studying philosophy, no question is more compelling to me than the question of whether a God is necessary for the Universe and life to exist. The reason I took this course was to explore this very question. Essentially the argument for theism vs. atheism comes down to an argument a materialist, naturalist, and mechanist view of the way the universe works against a determinist and purposeful view of the world. To be clear, I will not be arguing for a theistic or atheistc view of the universe, because through my research and personal experience, this view I have an impartial argument would be ideal to find the truth of the matter. Although as a warning it is nearly impossible to take an issue this personal to both myself and many others in such an impartial manner.

I will first go through C.S. Lewis’s famed argument from reason in defense of Christianity as analyzed by Victor Reppert in the Book C.S. Lewis: Life, Works and Legacy. I this argument, a materialist or naturalist account of the universe describes a world where everything that has happened or will happen is causally connected in a closed causal system. Each cause produces an effect which then goes on to produce another effect and so on for eternity. The Argument from reason cites that this account of the universe has several holes which cannot be accounted for. Lewis thought that if Naturalism was true then all beliefs could be explained through nonrational causes, and if no thought is valid if it is explained nonrationally, then if naturalism were true all thoughts are invalid. Naturalism, he presumes, does not leave room for cognition and rational thought. Because human beings reason and are conscious naturalism is invalid. The most important Argument from Lewis, however, is the inclusion of miracles. While Lewis argues that Biblical miracles could not be possible in a causally closed universe. I wish to extend his argument to say that life itself is a miracle. That we live in a universe that is organized and able to support life when it is much more likely in the naturalistic view that life cannot and should not exist. In the face of all that improbability a miracle has happened on this planet and in our universe, therefore, the universe is not causally closed. Moreover, Lewis makes the argument that consciousness does not lend itself to an evolutionary advantage. Nature, he says, would only allow us the opportunity to associate that a specific event follows the preceding event. Inferential, logical reasoning, or being able to deduce that events in general are causal, to say an even follows another, would be unlikely to arise evolutionarily and therefore must have been endowed by a creator. The final argument comes not from Lewis but from Aristotle’s Metaphysics and from Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics. A Naturalistic or causally connected view of the universe ultimately needs an ultimate cause or prime mover. Because something cannot exist from nothing, God must exist because the Universe exists.

However, a physicist and atheist named Lawrence Krauss in his lecture entitled, A Universe From Nothing, seems to counter the validity of a prime mover argument. While Krauss’s lecture is a physics lecture, and not a philosophy lecture, it does have profound religious and philosophical implications, and the tone of the lecture itself seems to be attacking religious beliefs. In his lecture, Krauss proves 2 fundamental properties of the universe that, in his view, prove that god does not need to exist for the universe to exist. He first proves that most of the energy in the universe, including the energy contained in ordinary matter like stars, planets, and humans, is held in empty space. So, in essence empty space isn’t empty at all, in fact its less empty than the rest of the universe, it is just undetectable. The second property is that the spatial curvature of the universe is flat, as opposed to a closed universe that curves back in on itself like a sphere, and an open universe, which is curved but open ended like a 4 dimensional piece of paper that has been folded almost in half but not quite. The combination of these two inferences about the universe produces some surprising conclusions. Krauss concludes that energy is empty space is constantly coming in and out of existence at a quantum level. Like matter/anti-matter inhalations, energy is constantly separating from and combining with negative energy. This means that the total energy of universe is zero. While that sounds like there is no energy in the universe, that assumption is incorrect. While the total energy of the universe is zero, energy and matter exist because there is an equal amount of negative energy and matter somewhere else in the universe. And because the total energy in the universe is zero, and energy a matter spontaneously come into existence from nothing on the quantum level, so long as an equal amount of negative energy and matter is also produced, this means that when the universe was sufficiently small is was entirely possible to come into existence from nothing. A universe that exists from nothing therefore does not require a deity to exist. This account also addresses the miracle argument that Lewis makes. Krauss postulates that the reason we exist in this universe is because we are here to observe it. Out of all the infinite possibilities of universes to exist in, we exist in this one because in all the other universes we cannot observe them therefore they are unknown to us. While the theist argument might conclude that because the conditions for life are so rare only with the assistance of a directing force outside our universe can life exist. Krauss proposes instead that because entire universes can be created spontaneously those universes could have existed and may exist in the future but only the ones where life is possible can conscious beings observe them.

cole's research presentation

For my research paper in metaphysics I decided to center it on a problem that all metaphysicians have been having since Aristotle: the problem of causation. From the time of Aristotle there have been issues concerning causation, whether it is something that is mechanical or teleological. In my paper I want to raise the issue of whether or not we can apply teleological causation, which we already are quick to apply to beings with consciousness, and apply it to things in nature that appear to us to have no consciousness at all. Three of the sources that I will be using in this paper are one: my primary source, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, specifically book two concerning causation. And for two of my secondary sources I will be using a book by Rowland Stout, “Things that happen because they should” and a book by Andrew woodfield titled, simply “Teleology”

From the very get go of Aristotle’s “Physics” he notes, “Some things are due to nature; for others there are other causes. Of the former sort are animals and their parts, plants, and simple bodies like earth, fire, air, and water.” Here right from the start is where the fork in the road splits the two modes of causation. Aristotle notices that in the world there are things that seem to be attributed to nature and there are these mysterious “other causes” these other causes will be the focus of my paper and specifically if these “other causes” can actually be applied to nature as a way to observe it.

Later in the text Aristotle will define these, “other causes” and he does so in chapter paragraph 30 when he says, “Further, it belongs to the same study, [the study of nature] to know the end or what something is for, and to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for [Telos in Greek]. For whenever there is a definite end to a continuous change, that last thing is also what it is for…” Here in lies one of the earliest difficulties of applying a teleological view of causation onto nature. That the Telos of a thing implies some type of purpose or end or it is something that Aristotle will say is not only the end, but is also the “best” of what it can be. If nature as Aristotle states were indeed a continuous change, then there would be no hope in labeling it with a telos, as it would never be able to reach its end. That is, if it is mealy an end, and not something else. If however, the end of a thing is not to be its ultimate and final end, but to be the best that it can be then the telos in nature seems quite logical. For example the final and ultimate end of a tree is not to grow and reproduce, because that reproduction dose not end the trees life it continues it by having another cause. But, if the telos of a thing and its purpose are to be the best that it can be, then the telos of the tree is certainly to be a seed bearing healthy multiplying tree. As this is the best thing that it can do and there is nothing better that it might hope to one day accomplish, such as learning to dance, or play the violin.

In stouts account of Teleology, He very quickly seperates teleological accounts into two distinct categories, “Justifications” and “causes” Stout’s argument is that what is given when a cause is explained teleological is not so much the cause of the thing, but instead a justification of the purpose of its happening. For example, “The teleological question why do we have teeth? Is asking for justification of teeth as well as a cause of them.” Therefore, it seems to be that when we ask questions of causation, what we are really asking is two things. The first justification, such as why do we have teeth at all? Why would we not be better off without them? What purpose do they serve us? As well as asking the latter question what is the cause of our having them? How did a chain of events occur such that we have come to have teeth? I know this seems like a silly example, but it is exactly these kinds of questions that rely on being able to make teleological claims. When attempting to make judgments about nature concerning theological causes, we must keep in mind these two aspects, both justification, and causation. Because once we move onto later thinkers who are concerned with the area of teleological causation the former cause of justification will become much more important and will be what we are really asking if we can make claims about in regards to nature.

My second secondary source lays out something else extremely important to the groundwork of any teleological expedition. Woodfield does an excellent job of noting what in nature sparks our interest in this question of purpose in causation and that is in the area of potentiality. He notes that it is through seeing what things in nature will inevitably become we come to conclude that nature has some type of direction or guidance. It is true that Aristotle has stated this before. But, Woodfield lays out the concept much more clearly.

“A flower, if it has the form of a rose, is a rose for that reason. Thus the form of a thing is intimately bound up with the idea of actuality and of being fully developed. Although a rosebud is not actually a rose, but only potentially, in calling it a bud of a rose we identify it in terms of what it is naturally going to become. To that extent the rosebud has potentially the form of a rose. “

While I apologize for the long block quote, it is of the utmost importance that this idea of potentiality gets fleshed out fully. For it is in this very idea of nature having potentiality that we come to think of nature as teleological at all and it is with this concept where my paper will begin.